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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is a collection of three essays relating household financial
obligations to asset prices. Financial obligations include both debt payments and
other financial commitments.
In the first essay, I investigate how household financial obligations affect the equity
premium. I modify the standard Mehra-Prescott (1985) consumption-based asset
pricing model to resolve the equity risk premium puzzle. I focus on two channels:
the preference channel and the borrowing constraints channel. Under reasonable
parameterizations, my model generates equity risk premiums similar in magnitudes
to those observed in U.S. data. Furthermore, I show that relaxing the borrowing
constraint shrinks the equity risk premium.
In the Second essay, I test the predictability of excess market returns using the
household financial obligations ratio. I show that deviations in the household
financial obligations ratio from its long-run mean is a better forecaster of future
market returns than alternative prediction variables. The results remain significant
using either quarterly or annual data and are robust to out-of-sample tests.
In the third essay, I investigate whether the risk associated with household
financial obligations is an economy-wide risk with the potential to explain
fluctuations in the cross-section of stock returns. The multifactor model I propose,
is a modification of the capital asset pricing model that includes the financial
obligations ratio as a “conditioning down” variable. The key finding is that there is
an aggregate hedging demand for securities that pay off in periods characterized by
higher levels of financial obligations ratios. The consistent pricing of financial
obligations risk with a negative risk premium suggests that the financial obligations
ratio acts as a state variable.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is a collection of three essays relating household financial
obligations to asset prices. In the first essay, I investigate how household financial
obligations affect the equity premium. I modify the standard Mehra-Prescott (1985)
consumption-based asset pricing model to resolve the equity risk premium puzzle. I
focus on two specific channels: the preference channel and the borrowing constraints
channel. Under reasonable parameterizations, my model generates equity risk
premium similar in magnitudes to the observed ones in US data. Furthermore, I
show that relaxing the borrowing constraints, shrinks the equity risk premium.
In my model, preferences are defined over households’ consumption relative to
their financial obligations. This is the preference channel. The framework is
analogous to habit formation models where the utility function depends on
consumption relative to some persistence level. However, unlike habit formation
models, the persistent level in my model — household financial obligations — is
observable, which is a key advantage over habit models in general. Also, in an
infinite-horizon aggregate household economy, the financial obligations ratio is used
as a proxy for households borrowing constraints. Households can borrow against
their income up to a certain level, which is exogenously set by a lending institution
arrangement. This is the borrowing constraint channel. The mechanism by which
the household financial obligations ratio helps explain the equity risk premium is as
follows: in recessions, when income falls, household financial obligations ratios
increase and hence lenders become reluctant to lend to the households. The
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borrowing constraint binds and makes it more difficult for households to smooth
their consumption exactly when they need to do so. However, in these bad times,
households also behave in a much more risk-averse fashion because they want to
make sure they can repay their debt obligations and financial commitments. This
dual mechanism both amplifies the risk premium and makes it time varying.
In the second essay, I test the predictability of excess market returns using the
household financial obligations ratio. I show that deviations of the household financial
obligations ratio from its long-run mean is a better forecaster of future market returns
than several other predicting variables. The results remain significant using either
quarterly or annual data and is robust to out of sample tests.
For the last two decades there have been many efforts to identify and establish
the existence of time variation in expected asset returns. It is now widely accepted
that excess returns are predictable by ratios such as dividend-price, earnings-price,
dividend-yield, investment-capital, and other financial indicators. However, these
financial variables, though successful at predicting long-horizon returns, are less
successful at predicting short-horizon returns. Therefore, we are also interested in
examining the linkage between macroeconomic variables and financial markets,
mostly because expected returns appear to vary with business cycles so that stock
market returns should be forecastable by business cycle variables at cyclical
frequencies. One macroeconomic business cycle variable that is successful at
predicting short-horizon returns is the consumption-wealth ratio (cay) proposed by
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) [43]. However, the statistical significance and
predictability power of the consumption-wealth ratio is hump-shaped and peaks at
around one year. Indeed, the predictability power shrinks over long horizons. In this
essay, I show that mean-deviations from the household obligations ratio create
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another macroeconomic business cycle variable whose predictability power is
significant at short horizons and remains more significant over longer horizons than
does the consumption-wealth ratio.
In the third essay, I investigate whether the risk associated with household
financial obligations is an economy-wide risk and thus significant at explaining
fluctuations in the cross-section of stock returns. The multifactor model proposed is
a modification of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) includes financial
obligations ratio as a “conditioning down” variable. The key finding is that there is
an aggregate hedging demand for securities that pay off in periods with high
financial obligations ratios. The consistent pricing of financial obligations risk with
a negative risk premium suggests that the financial obligations ratio acts as a state
variable.
The cross-sectional intuition is as follows: in bad times when incomes fall,
households’ financial obligations ratios increase. Portfolios that pay off in these
times are more valuable to investors because these portfolios hedge investors against
financial obligations risk. The increase in hedging demand for these portfolios raises
the price and hence implies lower expected returns. The negative financial
obligation risk premium delivers this lower expected return for asset whose payoffs
are positively correlated with the financial obligations ratio.
The macroeconomic variable explored in this research — financial obligations
ratio — provides a fresh opportunity to investigate the determinants of asset risk
in general. I show that there is systematic risk associated with high levels of the
households financial obligations ratio and that this risk is priced across different
portfolios. Furthermore, I show that mean deviations from financial obligations ratio
are a strong predictor of market returns over business cycle frequencies.
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Chapter 2
HOUSEHOLDS’ FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS RATIO
In this chapter, I define households’ financial obligations and financial obligation
ratio. Household financial obligations include total debt payments (mortgage debt
payments plus consumer debt payments) and total financial commitments (rent,
lease, insurance, and property tax payments). Financial obligations dramatically
affect households’ decisions. There is extensive documentation in the economic
psychology literature suggesting that financial obligations are associated with high
levels of anxiety and stress (Brown, Taylor, and Price (2005)[5], Richardson, Elliott,
and Roberts (2013)[54]). More important, this effect is independent of the poverty
with which it is often associated (Jenkins et al. (2008)[35], Meltzer et al.
(2011)[51]).
Financial obligations also affect households’ budget constraints. In particular, if
these obligations are high, relative to income, and it is not possible to roll over the
debt, then borrowers have to cut back on expenditures to avoid default. There is
evidence that high financial obligations reduce expenditures at the micro level.1 The
households’ financial obligations position is important in determining whether they
are constrained from optimal consumption smoothing. The fact that a household may
have been able to borrow in the past does not imply that it can borrow as much in the
future. However, household financial obligations in isolation are not indicative of the
household’s borrowing capability. Consider two households with the same financial
obligations but with different levels of income. Lenders are far more likely willing to
1The negative effect of a high debt service burden on consumption of households is shown by Olney
(1999)[52], Johnson and Li (2010)[37], Dynan, (2012)[17] and Juselius and Drehmann (2015)[39].
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lend to the household with higher income. Hence, I need to define an appropriate
variable as a direct proxy of borrowing constraints. I do this using the financial
obligations ratio, which I present in next section.
2.1 What Is the Financial Obligations Ratio and Why Does It Matter?
Households’ financial obligations ratio is defined as households’ total financial
obligations divided by their total disposable income. The financial obligations ratio
consists of two parts:
1. Total debt service ratio, which is equal to total debt payments divided by
total disposable income. Debt payments include all mortgage debt payments
and consumer debt payments including auto loans, student loans, and consumer
credit cards.
2. Total financial commitment ratio, which is equal to total financial
commitments divided by total disposable income. Financial commitments
include all rent payments, lease payments, insurance, and property tax
payments of the homeowners.
2.2 Properties of the Financial Obligations Ratio
The Federal Reserve Board has estimated the aggregate household financial
obligations ratio for the U.S. economy since 1980.2 Figure 2.1 shows that the
household financial obligations ratio is a time-varying macroeconomic variable that
has an average value of 16.65%. As this figure suggests, the financial obligations
ratio tends to move counter cyclically over business cycles.
2More discussion is provided in Appendix A.
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Figure 2.1: Household Financial Obligations as a Percentage of Disposable Income
When the economy is good, consumers spend more and increase their financial
obligations. Then, when the economy is hit by a negative shock (recession),
consumers who have wracked up high financial obligations cannot smooth their
consumption exactly when they need to do so. Hence, we observe that the financial
obligations ratio is high in the early stage of almost every recession because
households are carrying heavy financial obligations from “good old days” and then
the ratio decreases as the economy recovers and households delever slowly. A higher
financial obligations ratio also implies less investment in risky assets. This is due to
the fact that when households are overextended, even a small income shortfall
prevents them from smoothing consumption and making new investments
(Drehmann and Juselius (2012)[38]). Figure 2.1 shows that after almost every
recession, the financial obligations ratio pulls back to lower levels because of the
households’ higher income during booms.3 Thus, the financial obligations ratio has
a counter-cyclical property. The shaded areas in Figure 2.1 indicate U.S. recession
periods. Properties of the financial obligations ratio that are pertinent to this
research are as follows:
3Another reason is that when household obligations ratios are high and unemployment is rising,
lenders may respond to the expected increase in defaults by limiting the availability of credit. This
leads to lower aggregate payments and a lower obligations ratio.
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• All the components of the financial obligations ratio are observable. Hence,
when working with the data, there is no need to come up with questionable
proxies for the ratio.
• The financial obligations ratio is directly related to the interest rate. By
construction, the higher the interest rate, the higher the payments and the
higher the financial obligations. This explicit dependency establishes a direct
link between obligation ratios and the predictability of stock market returns.4
• The financial obligations ratio captures the burden of obligations on
households more accurately than does the established debt-to-GDP ratio.
More specifically, the financial obligations ratio accounts for changes in
interest rates and maturities that affect households’ repayment capacity.
• Drehmann and Juselius (2012)[38] find that the debt service ratio (which is
the main part of financial obligations ratio) produces a reliable early warning
signal ahead of systemic banking crises. In the context of absolute asset pricing,
this is important because I am looking for a conditioning down variable that is
correlated with business cycles, especially in bad times.
• The financial obligations ratio can be used as a direct indicator for borrowing
constraints. Johnson and Li (2010)[37] test the proposition that a higher debt
service ratio increases the likelihood of credit denial.5 Therefore, a household’s
obligation ratio is a critical input for lending institutions to decide whether to
provide the household with more leverage. Note that this ratio is a better proxy
4Juselius and Drehmann (2015)[39] argue that the average lending rate reflects not only
current interest rate conditions, but also past money market rates, past inflation and interest rate
expectations as well as past risk and term premia. This implies that the lending rate, and hence the
debt service ratio, is chiefly influenced by current and past monetary policy decisions.
5A household with a debt service ratio in the top two quantiles of the distribution is significantly
more likely than other households to have been turned down for credit in previous years (2005-2010).
7
for borrowing constraints than the traditional debt-to-income ratio because the
debt-to-income ratio does not consider debt maturities.
In the following chapters, I first investigate how households financial obligations
affect the equity risk premium. I then test the predictability of excess market returns
using the financial obligations ratio. Finally, I show that my multifactor model can
explain the cross-sectional variations in stock returns using the financial obligations
ratio as a “conditioning down” variable.
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Chapter 3
HOW DO HOUSEHOLDS’ FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS AFFECT THE EQUITY
RISK PREMIUM?
In this chapter, I study how household financial obligations affect the equity risk
premium. The model I develop focuses on two channels: preference channel and
borrowing constraints channel. Preferences are defined as households consumption
relative to their financial obligations. These preferences allow for time variation in
risk aversion. The model also introduces dynamic borrowing constraints, using the
household financial obligations ratio as a proxy. In an infinite-horizon aggregate
household economy, households can borrow against their uninsurable stochastic
endowments. Borrowing limits are exogenously set by an institutional arrangement.
A novel feature of the model is that in states of high marginal utility, when income
falls, lenders become reluctant to lend, the borrowing constraint binds, making it
more difficult for households to smooth consumption. In addition, in these states,
households become more risk averse. This dual mechanism both amplifies the risk
premia and makes it time varying.
9
3.1 Introduction
Mehra and Prescott (1985)[50] , modify a Lucas (1978)[46] -type exchange
economy to reconcile standard neoclassical macroeconomic theory with U.S. data on
the equity premium. In a consumption based asset pricing setup, they specify an
explicit two-state Markov process for consumption growth and calculate the price of
the consumption claim and the risk-free rate. They find that under reasonable
parameterization, the model is able, at most, to generate an equity premium of
about 0.35 % as opposed to the 6 % premium observed in the data. They term this
the “equity premium puzzle” and argue that the mean stock excess return
calculated in their calibrated economy is too low, unless the coefficient of relative
risk aversion is raised to implausibly high values.
There is no easy way to summarize the huge literature on the equity risk premium
puzzle. Nevertheless, there is consensus among researchers that only an absolute
asset pricing model can explain the equity risk premium rather than a portfolio-
based 1 model. After all, portfolio models are relative asset pricing models and
cannot answer questions such as why the average returns are what they are or why
the expected market return varies over time. To answer these questions, we need
to construct a macroeconomic-based asset pricing model. Note that the most basic
absolute pricing model — the standard consumption based model — performs poorly
in explaining the historical equity premium puzzle and cross-sectional variations in
expected returns. Hence, proposing a macroeconomic-based asset pricing model with
the ability to explain the equity risk premium and cross-sectional variations in excess
returns has long been the focus of macro finance researchers.
1The absolute pricing model refers to asset pricing models that use macroeconomic variables such
as consumption, labor income, GDP growth, and interest rate.
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In the last 30 years, many efforts have been made to solve the equity premium
puzzle. Multiple generalizations have been proposed to address the shortcomings of
the standard consumption-based model. To approach the puzzle, it is natural to
start with the dependency of the marginal utility of consumption variables other
than today’s consumption. Employing a non separable utility function allows for
this dependency, and indeed this is what has been done in the literature
(Eichenbaum, Hansen, and Singleton (1988) [20], Eichenbaum and Hansen (1990)
[19], Ait-Sahalia, Parker, and Yogo (2004) [57], Pakos (2004) [47], Piazzesi,
Schneider, and Tuzel (2007) [53]). Another generalization is to consider non
separability over time (Constantinides (1990) [24], Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
[6]) and/or non separability across states of nature (Epstein and Zin (1991) [21]).
Relaxing expected utility assumptions (Kreps and Porteus (1978) [41]),
incorporating modified probability distributions to admit rare events (Rietz (1988),
[55] and Barro (2006) [4]), and considering incomplete markets (Constantinides,
Donaldson and Mehra (2002) [15] , Constantinides and Duffie (1996) [14]) are just
some risk-based explanations that have been offered to solve the equity premium
puzzle.2
In my version of the consumption-based asset pricing model, household financial
obligations affect the equity risk premium via two channels. The first is the
preference channel where individuals’ preferences are defined as consumption
relative to financial obligations. The framework is analogous to habit formation
models where the utility function depends on consumption relative to some habit
level (Abel (1990)[1], Constantinides (1990)[24] and Campbell and Cochrane
2 For more recent literature, look at one of John Cochrane’s latest essays based on a talk at
the University of Melbourne 2016 Finance Down Under conference [13]. He surveys many current
frameworks including habits, long run risks, idiosyncratic risks, heterogenous preferences, rare
disasters, probability mistakes, and debt or institutional finance.
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(1999)[6]). However, in my model the persistence level is observable, which is an
advantage over other standard habit formation models. With this setup, the
marginal utility derived from the model is directly related to two components:
household consumption and household financial obligations.
The preference channel is important because one possible explanation for
consumption variation is the potential impact of a household’s debt level on its
preferences. If households are averse to holding large amounts of debt relative to
income, a decline in income will prompt larger declines in consumption among
highly indebted households to restore the desired debt-to-income ratio for a wide
range of loss functions (Baker (2015)[3]). Conversely, there is evidence that
individuals who are more likely to face income uncertainty or to become liquidity
constrained exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion in the presence of uninsurable
risk (Guiso and Paiella (2008)[25]). By defining households’ preferences as
consumption relative to financial obligations, the preference channel captures the
time-varying risk aversion behavior of individuals by featuring fluctuations in
consumption net of financial obligations over business cycles.
The second channel I investigate is the borrowing constraint channel from which
most asset pricing models abstract. 3 In an infinite-horizon aggregate household
economy, the financial obligations ratio — defined as total debt payments, housing
payments, and auto lease payments divided by total disposable income — act as the
borrowing constraint in my model. I show that the equity risk premium implied
by the model is sensitive to the financial obligations ratio as a proxy for borrowing
constraints.
3One example that considers the impact of borrowing constraints on the equity risk premium is
Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (2002)[15]. They use an overlapping generation model.
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But why should the model work? Which elements of the model enables it to
explain/generate the observed equity risk premium in U.S. data? The intuition is
straight-forward. As consumption rises in good times, households take on more debt
and debt payments gradually increase. In bad times, consumption falls and
households de-lever slowly. Thus, debt payments move slowly following
consumption. Now consider a household that has taken on a specific debt level it
must repay. In recessions, as income declines toward this specific level of debt
payments, the household reduces its consumption because of risk and risk aversion.
Indeed, to ensure that it can make its debt payments, the household exhibits more
risk aversion and takes on less risk. This decreases the demand for risky assets and
increases the demand for precautionary savings in recessions. During booms,
however, consumption moves away from slow-moving financial obligations and hence
the household becomes less risk averse and takes on more risk. Thus, the lower ratio
of consumption to financial obligations in bad times and the higher ratio in good
times directly affect the household’s marginal utility and make the pricing kernel
more volatile. This is the household time-varying risk aversion that leads to a shift
in the composition of its portfolio from risky to risk-free assets, and this is what
generates the equity premium.
Also note that in bad times, because of lower income, households face a higher
financial obligations ratio. This means that lenders are less willing to lend to them in
these states of the economy. Thus, households’ borrowing constraints become binding
exactly when they want to smooth consumption. Now because they cannot borrow to
consume, they must either invest less or liquidate more of their assets. In either case,
they start by divesting risky assets rather than risk-free assets (recall that the model
features a time-varying risk aversion and people are more risk averse in a recession).
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The decrease in demand for risky assets is much faster than the decrease in demand
for risk-free assets. This generates a higher risk premium during recessions. This
intuition is consistent with my findings when I relax the borrowing constraint. As I
let the households borrow more in bad times, the equity risk premium shrinks. Time-
varying borrowing constraints are basically factors that make households shift from
risky assets to risk-free assets.
In summary, a novel feature of the model is that in states of high marginal utility
(i.e., in recessions, when income falls), lenders are reluctant to lend, the borrowing
constraint binds, and it becomes more difficult for households to smooth consumption
exactly when they need to do so. In addition, in these states, households become more
risk averse. This dual mechanism both amplifies the risk premia and makes it time
varying.
The economic variable explored in this essay — the financial obligations ratio —
provides a fresh opportunity to investigate the determinants of asset risk. As a start,
in separate research, I (Jahangiry (2016a)[32]) document that the risk associated with
aggregate household financial obligations is an economy wide risk and is significant
for explaining the variations in the cross-section of stock returns. Conditioning down
on the financial obligations ratio, the FCAPM proposed in Jahangiry (2016a)[32],
survives a wide range of classical econometric and diagnostic tests for explaining the
variations in average returns across 25 portfolios formed based on size and book-to-
market ratio. In another study, I (Jahangiry (2016c)[34]) take one step further and
test the predictability of stock returns/excess returns using households obligations
ratio. Using U.S. stock market data, I show that the household’s debt service ratio
can predict market returns at short horizons and over business cycle frequencies.
Jahangiry (2016c) argues that mean deviations from the debt service ratio are a
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better forecaster of future returns both in sample and out of sample than several
other popular forecasting variables.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, I set up the model and
derive the fundamental equations of asset pricing. In Section 3.3 I discuss the data
and estimations. I provide the results of the model in Section 3.4 and the conclusion
in Section 3.5.
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3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Environment
I consider an infinite horizon endowment economy in which the agents are endowed
with an uninsurable stochastic income at each period. The agents in this economy
are:
1. Large number of homogeneous households and
2. A lending institution.
I use a modified version of the Greenwook-Hercowitz-Huffman utility structure that
enables me to represent aggregate households with a representative agent. Therefore,
I have a representative agent environment with an external supply of debt provided
by lending institutions. This can be thought of as a small open economy. Assume
that the lending institution is aware of the income distribution of the representative
agent. There are three assets and two markets in this economy. The assets are
one perishable consumption good and two durable assets: an inside security and an
outside security (debt instrument). The inside security provides dividends according
to an exogenous stochastic process and the outside security is exogenously supplied
by the lending institution. The environment is summarized in Table 3.1. The two
markets in the model are:
1. The capital market, which is a market for allocating idiosyncratic risk among
households. In this capital market everything is in zero net supply. Households
can trade contingent claims (inside securities) among themselves but because all
households are identical, the prices are shadow prices for a no-trade equilibrium.
2. The debt market, in which there is an outside supply of debt (outside
security) provided by a lending institution. I do not model the supply side of
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the debt market. The lending rate is an exogenously specified rate.
Households can borrow from this lending institution to a certain amount
defined by their financial obligations ratio.
Table 3.1: The Model Environment
Capital Market Debt Market
Households Households + a lending institution
One inside security One outside security
Zero net supply Positive net supply
No trade equilibrium Exogenous prices
3.2.2 Constraints
In each period, households are endowed with stochastic exogenous income that
they can either consume or invest in an inside security. They are allowed to borrow
against their stochastic income and use it only for consumption purposes. The
model has a non stationary environment because of the non stationarity of the
stochastic aggregate income and the exogenous dividends of the inside security.
However, the exogenous stochastic borrowing rates are stationary. Consumption,
financial obligation, dividends, aggregate disposable income, prices of the equity,
and the risk-free bond are all denominated in units of the consumption good.
In the model, for each period t, Ct is aggregate consumption, Yt is aggregate
disposable income, and Xt represents the dividends generated by the inside security.
By making the wage income process exogenous, I abstract from the labor-leisure
trade-off. This means that labor is supplied inelastically and the labor-leisure choice
is not modeled. Dt is the debt service level borrowed by the representative agent
at the gross rate Rdt . I assume that the lending institutional arrangement can issue
17
and redeem debt instruments. This lending institution exogenously set a lending
cap θt on each household. Hence, θt provides a state-dependent upper bound for
the household’s borrowing capacity. Zt is a non-negative amount of investment in an
inside security with an ex-dividend price of pt at time t. The agent faces the following
constraints:
1. Budget constraint
Ct + ptZt +Dt−1Rdt−1 ≤ Yt + (pt +Xt)Zt−1 +Dt (3.1)
2. Financial obligations constraint
DtR
d
t ≤ θtYt, Dt ≥ 0. (3.2)
Inequality (3.1) is the budget constraint the agent faces in each period. The agent
comes into the period with stochastic wage income Yt. There is also income from
securities purchased in the last period. The agent can liquidate Zt amount of inside
security at price pt with dividend Xt. Further-more, the agent can borrow against
his stochastic income at amount Dt. These are the resources of funds. Now, the left-
hand side of (3.1) shows how the agent spends the available funds. First he consumes
Ct, then he can purchase an inside security to take to the next period, and finally
he must pay interest on the debt he borrowed. Rdt−1 is the gross return on the debt
instrument, and it means that the agent has to pay back whatever he has borrowed
in last period plus the interest. At t = 0, the representative agent begins debt free
D−1 = 0, and he is endowed with nothing but stochastic income Y0 i.e., Z0 = 0.
Inequality (3.2) is the borrowing constraint. It indicates how much the agent can
borrow against his labor income. This financial obligations ratio constraint (3.2) is a
type of constraint that we observe in the economy. Interest payments on debt over
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income is a number that lenders would like see below some certain levels such as 1/3 or
1/4, and this number varies over time. Inequality (3.2) is a constraint I impose in this
model and it is one of the innovations of the model, the borrowing constraint channel
4 . Note that income Yt, dividends Xt, and obligation ratio cap θt are all exogenous
stochastic variables. For calculation purposes, I work with detrended income yt
5 and
dividend growth xt which are determined by the following Markov processes:
yt+1 = (1− ρy)y¯ + ρyyt + yt+1, (3.3)
xt+1 = (1− ρx)x¯+ ρxxt + xt+1. (3.4)
In equations (3.3) and (3.4), y¯ and x¯ are the averages of detrended aggregate income
and dividend growth, respectively. ρy and ρx are the auto-correlations, and epsilons
are the relevant shocks associated with y and x. Finally, the exogenous process for
financial obligations ratio cap θt is defined as in (3.5):
Et(θt+1|yt) = f(yt). (3.5)
Equation (3.5) implies that the process of θ is totally pinned down by the process of
y. This assumption is intuitive as the lending institution sets θ exogenously and it is
aware of the household’s income distribution. Timing of the constraints is as follows.
At time t, the agent knows at what rate he can borrow, so Rdt is measurable with
respect to time t. According to the financial obligations constraint in (3.2), Dt is also
measurable at time t. Thus, the only random variables here are Y and θ. Note that
4The innovation is introducing a state dependent time-varying borrowing constraint. I make the
borrowing capacity to be state dependent. In bad times, the financial obligations ratio is higher
(because of negative income shock) and the agent’s borrowing capability shrinks thereafter. This
forces the agent to further reduce his consumption in bad times.
5In our sample, since the income follows a deterministic trend, we detrend the income by time-
detrending.
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there is no default in this model. Under my parameterization, the agent can always
reduce his consumption such that he has positive net worth. In other words, he never
has a realization of Y so low that he cannot pay off his debt by reducing consumption.
In addition, the lender chooses θ conditional on some expectation of future income
of the agent. Therefore, if the lender’s conditional expectations of future income are
low, it will lower θ to make sure the agent can pay off his debts. Hence, the lender
is building expectations of θt+1 based on yt. It means that when expected income is
low, the lender reacts by decreasing θt+1 conditional on yt such that the conditional
expectation of θ is lower than it’s expected value, that is, Et(θt+1|Yt) ≤ θ¯.
In short, in this model, the lender is the one monopolist and everybody else is a
price taker. This monopolist has some expectations of agents’ income and is going to
reduce the amount that agents can borrow, precisely when they would like to borrow
next period. This is the building block of my model and it shows how the model
generates a more volatile marginal utilities. In bad times, effective consumption
(consumption net of financial obligations) is smaller and in good times it is bigger
than the standard consumption in a Mehra-Prescott (1995) world. Therefore, with
this set-up, everything is conditional on Yt. The variations in the marginal rate of
substitution determine the returns on the inside security, and hence, these are the
extra variations in dividends that will generate higher equity premiums.
3.2.3 Preferences
The utility function presented here shows how the financial obligations ratio
affects the equity risk premium via the preference channel. In my model, the agent’s
preferences are defined as consumption relative to financial obligation G. This is a
behavioral set-up that is analogous to habit formation models. In the sense that,
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where as in habit formation models, the distance from the consumption habit gives
the agent utility, in my model the distance from the financial obligation does the
same job. More specifically, I use the simple power utility function defined as the
representative agent’s effective consumption C∗, where C∗ is consumption net of
financial obligations incorporating the distance from the financial obligations.
Effective consumption is defined as C∗t = Ct − Gt where Gt = Dt−1Rdt−1 is the
financial obligations the agent carries over to period t from the last period. Hence,
the utility function of the agent is:
U(C∗t ) =
C∗t
(1−γ)
1− γ =
1
1− γ (Ct −Gt)
(1−γ) (3.6)
Equation (3.6) suggests that a household with lower financial obligations has a
higher effective consumption and hence receives a higher utility. This behavioral
setup is chosen based on insights from economic psychology literature on the
psychological impact of being in debt. Financial obligations are associated with high
levels of anxiety and stress (Brown, Taylor, and Price (2005)[5], Richardson, Elliott,
and Roberts (2013)[54]). And more important, this impact is independent of the
poverty with which it is often associated (Jenkins et al. (2008)[35], Meltzer et al.
(2011)[51]). This is the behavioral rational to include financial obligations in the
utility function.
There is also a structural reason. Specifically, I use difference form
(C − G)(Constantinides (1990)[24], Campbell, and Cochrane (1999)[6], rather than
the ratio form (C
G
)(Abel (1990)[1], because the difference form generates a
time-varying relative risk aversion. 6 Time-varying risk aversion plays an important
6 However, there is no consensus on the pro cyclicality or counter cyclicality of relative risk
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role in determining the equity premium, especially during recessions, because
“recessions are phenomena of risk premiums, risk aversion, risk bearing capacity and
desires to shift the composition of a portfolio from risky to risk-free assets, a flight
to quality, not a phenomenon of intertemporal substitution, a desire to consume
more tomorrow vs. today.” 7 Also note that in this model, Ct − Gt is always
positive. People slowly develop financial obligations, so consumption is always
greater than debt obligations (no default assumption); indeed, financial obligations
form the trend in consumption.
With this specification in (3.6), the coefficient of relative risk aversion is:
RRA = −Cu
′′(C)
u′(C)
= γ
(
1
C−G
G
)
=
γ
S
,
where S = C−G
C
is the consumption surplus. This is analogous to the Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) habit model, with financial obligations replacing the consumption
habit. It is important to note that the persistence level in my model is observable,
which is an advantage to over Campbell and Cochrane’s external habit model in
which the habit level is not observable. However, the idea is the same: in bad times,
as consumption or the surplus consumption ratio S decreases, the agent’s relative
risk aversion rises; that is, the same proportional risk to consumption is a more fear-
inducing event when consumption starts closer to financial obligations G.
The link between consumption surplus S and the financial obligations ratio is
straight-forward. Financial obligations G is like a slow-moving habit in this model.
In recessions, when a negative shock to the aggregate income is realized, it increases
the current financial obligations ratio of the representative agent. According to the
aversion. Risk aversion is counter cyclical in habit formation models (in recessions, the consumption
surplus ratio is lower so risk aversion is higher) and pro cyclical in happiness maintenance models
(in good times, individuals become more risk averse as they wish the good days will never end).
7John Cochrane, Macro-Finance, Feb 2016 [13]
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budget constraint(3.1) and the borrowing constraint (3.2), the agent has no option
but to decrease his consumption Ct
8 . This moves consumption closer to slow-moving
obligation G and hence reduces consumption surplus S. Therefore, in recessions
(negative income shocks), the financial obligations ratio is high, consumption surplus
is low, and relative risk aversion is high. This enables the model to deliver a time-
varying, recession-driven equity risk premium.
3.2.4 Stochastic Sequential Problem
The representative agent maximizes the following sequential problem :
Max E0
{
t=∞∑
t=0
βtU(C∗t )
}
,
where U(C∗t ) =
C∗t
1−γ
1−γ and C
∗
t = Ct − Gt subject to the budget constraint (3.1),
borrowing constraint (3.2), exogenous stochastic processes (3.3)-(3.5), and the the
non-negativity constraints:
Gt = Dt−1Rdt−1
Ct + ptZt +Dt−1Rdt−1 ≤ Yt + (pt +Xt)Zt−1 +Dt
DtR
d
t ≤ θtYt
yt+1 = (1− ρy)y¯ + ρyyt + yt+1
xt+1 = (1− ρx)x¯+ ρxxt + xt+1
Et(θt+1|yt) = f(yt)
Ct ≥ 0, Dt ≥ 0, Zt ≥ 0
Given X0, Y0, R
d
0 , Z0 = D−1 = 0
8This is true because: (1) there is a no-trade equilibrium — the representative agent does not
have the option of liquidating assets; (2) it is implicitly assumed that the agent cannot default on
his debt payments so he must pay back Dt−1Rdt in full; and (3) in bad times the financial obligations
ratio is already capped so the agent cannot leverage any more.
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For simplification, I assume the exogenous lending rate is constant and equal to
Rdt = R¯
d. The transversality condition holds for financial obligations, which implies
that the shadow value of debt service must be equal to zero in the limit. I also assume
Inada conditions on effective consumption. The economy is completely specified by
the preference parameters β, γ, and realization of the stochastic processes followed
by Λt = (yt, xt, θt). Equilibrium is defined as the sequences of consumption {C˜t},
investment {Z˜t}, borrowing decisions {D˜t} of the representative agent, and prices pt
such that:
1. Taking the prices and exogenous vector Λ as given, the sequences of
consumption, investment, and borrowing decisions optimizes households’
lifetime expected utility.
2. Consumption, capital, and debt markets clear in all periods.9
3.2.5 Pricing Kernel
Given the utility function in (3.6), the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution
(the pricing kernel) is: 10
Mt+1 = β
Uc(C
∗
t+1)
Uc(C∗t )
= β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ (
St+1
St
)−γ
, (3.7)
where St =
Ct−Gt
Ct
. The pricing kernel is related to consumption growth and
consumption surplus, which depends on financial obligations and is an implicit state
9Note that there is no need to clear the debt market; as mentioned earlier, debt service rates are
exogenously determined.
10The log-linearized version of the pricing kernel and interpretation of the interest rate is provided
in Appendix B.
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variable. I can now calculate moments of the marginal rate of substitution (3.7) and
find asset prices. Taking the first-order conditions (FOCs) with respect to Ct, Dt,
and Zt and combining the results gives the “fundamental equations of asset pricing.”
From FOC ([Ct], [Zt]) the price of the inside security is:
pt = Et
(
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ (
St+1
St
)−γ
(pt+1 +Xt+1)
)
(3.8)
With equation (3.8) the price of any inside security can be derived given its dividend.
To calculate the equity risk premium the price of risk-free bond qt is needed. Using
(3.8) and the fact that no-coupon Treasury bonds are traded in discounted values,
the price of risk-free bond is equal to:
qt = Et
(
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ (
St+1
St
)−γ
1
)
(3.9)
Market-clearing conditions imply that Zt = 0 ∀t ≥ 0; this is because every
household is the same and the equilibrium outcome must be the no-trade outcome.
I am interested in finding the prices that support this no-trade outcome. From
market clearings and budget constraints, the equilibrium consumption sequence is:
Ct = Yt +Dt −Dt−1Rdt . (3.10)
Only one step remains to finding an explicit-form solution for the equity price and
the risk-free bond price. Fortunately, it is easy to show that the debt service ratio
constraint in (3.2) is binding.11 This implies that the representative agent will cap
11Note that at each period t, the utility function Ut is strictly increasing in consumption Ct, so the
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the amount of borrowing and paves the way for calculating the equity premium and
the risk-free rate implied by the model. Using the equilibrium consumption path in
(3.10) along with equations (3.8) and (3.9), gives the fundamental equations of asset
pricing at the equilibrium.
Note that it is convenient to define wt =
pt
Xt
as the price-dividend ratio because it
allows the equilibrium equity returns to be written down in terms of dividend growth,
which is stationary, and not the dividend itself, which is not stationary. Therefore,
by dividing both sides of (3.8) by Xt, (3.8) can be written as:
12
wt = βEt
{(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ (
St+1
St
)−γ
(1 + wt+1)(
Xt+1
Xt
)
}
, (3.11)
where Xt+1
Xt
is dividend growth. Equations (3.9) and (3.11) can be used to solve for
the risk-free rate Rft , equity returns R
e
t , and consequently the equity premium EPt.
Rft =
1
qt
=
1
βEt
((
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ (
St+1
St
)−γ) (3.12)
Ret+1 = Et
(
pt+1 +Xt+1
Xt
)
= Et
(
wt+1Xt+1 +Xt+1
wtXt
)
= Et
{(
Xt+1
Xt
)(
1 + wt+1
wt
)}
,
(3.13)
where wt is defined as in (3.11).
Finally, the equity premium is simply defined as (3.13) minus (3.12):
budget constraint and the borrowing constraint bind to guarantee that the agent is maximizing his
preferences. However, one may argue that as financial obligations increase, effective consumption
decreases. This is not true here, as current obligation Gt is a function of last-period debt service
Dt−1 and not the current borrowing Dt.
12The right-hand side of (3.8) is a conditional expectation; by applying the Law of iterated
expectations Xt can be taken into the conditional expectation.
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EPt = Et(R
e
t+1)−Rft (3.14)
In the end, if the exogenous variables follow Markov processes, then solving functional
equations in (3.12) and (3.13) is simply solving a finite system of linear equations.
Thus defining the exogenous stochastic processes for aggregate real income and the
dividend growth rate, the model can be tested by comparing the observed equity
premium and risk-free rates in U.S. data to the rates implied by the model. Note that
the model deals with a non stationary environment because of the non stationarity
of aggregate dividends and aggregate income. This enables the model to generate
a non stationary equilibrium consumption path, non stationary equity prices, and a
stationary equity premium, which is consistent with the data.13
3.3 Data and Estimations
The motivation of this chapter is to compare the equity risk premium observed
in U.S. data with the equity risk premium generated by the model presented in this
chapter. I use annual data from 1980 to 2015 to report the equity premium observed
in the data. Table 3.2 summarizes the data source.
Next, the equity premium implied by the model is estimated in a calibrated
endowment economy. Generally, the solutions to asset pricing equations (3.8) and
(3.9) are not available in an analytically simple closed form. However, there are
instances where calculation of the exact solution, or a good approximation, is
possible. In my model the binding borrowing constraint does the job and makes it
13Note that the risk-free bond prices generated by (3.9) are stationary because qt depends only
on consumption growth and financial obligations growth, which are both stationary.
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Table 3.2: Data Source
Variables Data source (1980-2015)
S&P composite prices and dividends Robert J. Shiller data
One month T-Bill returns Center for Research in Security Prices
Consumer Price Index U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Aggregate income per capita National Income and Product Accounts
Household financial obligations ratio Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
possible to solve for closed-form solutions. Indeed, solutions to functional equations
(3.12) and (3.13) depend on values of three exogenous stochastic processes for yt, xt,
and θt. Note that R
d
t has already been assumed to be constant and equal to R¯
d.
More specifically, using the weighted average annual rate of commercial bank
interest rate on credit cards and one-year adjustable rate mortgages, the average
gross borrowing rate is equal to 1.085.
A typical problem is how to characterize the price of an asset, where the laws
of motion for exogenous stochastic state variables are AR(1) processes. Therefore,
the next step is to check whether the stochastic processes for y and x, are stationary
over time and then estimate them with an AR(1) process. Table 3.3 summarizes
the results of stationarity tests for detrended aggregate income and dividend growth
using two methods: augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test (ADF)(1979)[16], and the
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS)[42] stationarity test.
As Table 3.3 suggests, the ADF test statistics for detrended income y and
aggregate dividend growth x are equal to -5.343 and -5.042, respectively, meaning
that the null hypothesis can be rejected (null: yt and xt exhibit unit root
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Table 3.3: Stationarity Test
ADF Test Statistic KPSS Test Statistic
yt xt yt xt
-5.343 -5.042 0.243 0.273
1 % level -3.643 0.739
5 % level -2.954 0.463
10 % level -2.615 0.347
properties). Also, using the KPSS test, the null hypothesis that the variables are
stationary over time cannot be rejected as the test statistics are smaller than the
critical values. Thus, it is reasonable to estimate the stochastic processes for income
and dividend growth with an autoregressive process AR(1).
For deriving a numerical closed-form solution and generating the equity risk
premium implied by the model, the last step is to discretize AR(1) processes for
income and divided growth. I use the Rouwenhorst (1995)[56] technique to
discretize the AR processes. In this study, the Rouwenhorst method is prefered to
the Tauchen (1986)[58] approach for the following reasons. First, the residuals of
both AR(1) processes pass the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
(ARCH) test; that is, the heteroskedasticity of residuals can be rejected. Second, I
discretize the economy with a two-state Markov process for each y and x. When the
number of states is small (equal to two here), the Rouwenhorst technique
outperforms the Tauchen approach. Recall that the AR(1) stochastic processes for
income and dividend growth are as follows:
yt+1 = (1− ρy)y¯ + ρyyt + yt+1
xt+1 = (1− ρx)x¯+ ρxxt + xt+1
. In my model, the stochastic process for the financial obligations cap is fully
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determined by the process for aggregate income. Table 3.4 summarizes the
estimated parameters of AR(1) processes.
Table 3.4: AR(1) Estimations
Parameter/Variable Description
y Normalized labor income per capita (detrended) y¯ = 1 , ρy = 0.64 , y = 0.08
x Dividend growth x¯ = 1.032 , ρx = 0.61 , x = 0.05
θ Financial obligations ratio cap θ¯ = 0.165, σθ = 0.009
The economy is completely specified by the realization of the joint stochastic
process followed by aggregate real income and dividend growth. I model the joint
process of aggregate income and dividend growth as a time-stationary Markov chain
with a nondegenerate, unique, stationary probability distribution. Starting with real
aggregate income, I assume that yt follows a two-state Markov chain (y,Q, pi
Y ) where y
is the state vector, Q is a 2X2 transition matrix, and piY is the probability distribution.
The two states are high (H) and low (L), which stand for high and low aggregate
income during booms and recessions, respectively. Therefore, I define the states
vector y as:
y = (yH , yL) = (µY + δY , µY − δY ),
where µY is long-run aggregate income and δY is its standard deviation. The
probability distribution piY is defined as :
piRij = Pr(yt+1 = yj|yt = yi)
Then the transition matrix Q is symmetric with:
Q =
q11 q12
q21 q22
 =
 piY11 1− piY11
1− piY22 piY22
 =
 φY 1− φY
1− φY φY
 ,
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where φY is the long-run auto correlation coefficient of y.
Next, I assume that dividend growth xt also follows a Two-states Markov process
(x, P k, piX) where x is the state vector and P k is a 2X2 transition matrix where k:
H,L, meaning that the transition matrix for x depends on whether y is in a high or
low state. Also piX is the probability distribution. Again the two states are high (H)
and low (L), standing for high and low dividend growth. I define the states vector x
as:
x = (xH , xL) = (µX + δX , µX − δX),
where µX is long-run aggregate dividend growth and δX is its standard deviation.
The probability distribution piX is defined as:
piXij = Pr(xt+1 = xj|xt = xi).
Then the transition matrix P k is symmetric with:
P k =
 piX11 1− piX11
1− piX22 piX22
 =
 φXk 1− φXk
1− φXk φXk
 ,
where φXk is the long-run auto-correlation coefficient of x conditional on whether
y is in its high (k : yH) or low (k : yL) states. Therefore, the exogenous joint
stochastic processes for y and x follow a four-state coupled Markov chain with an
1-by-4 probability distribution pi and a 4X2 state matrix yx:
yx =

yxHH
yxHH
yxHH
yxHH

=

yH xH
yH xL
yL xH
yL xL

,
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and a 4X4 transition matrix SY X :
SY X =
HH HL LH LL

HH s11 s12 s13 s14
HL s21 s22 s23 s24
LH s31 s32 s33 s34
LL s41 s42 s43 s44
,
where sij can be calculated directly from transition matrices Q and P . For example,
s12 = SY XHL,HH and is derived by:
s12 = SyxHL,HH = Pr(yxt+1 = yxHL|yxt = yxHH) = Pr
 yt+1 = yH yt = yH
xt+1 = xL xt = xH
s12 = Pr(xt+1 = xL, |xt = xH , yt = yH) ∗Pr(yt+1 = yH , |yt = yH) = PH12 ∗ q11,
where PH12 is the 1, 2 element of the matrix P
H . Similar reasoning leads to the
following transition matrix for SY X :
SY X =


PH11q11 P
H
12q11 P
L
11q12 P
L
12q12
PH21q11 P
H
22q11 P
L
21q12 P
L
22q12
PH11q21 P
H
12q21 P
L
11q22 P
L
12q22
PH21q21 P
H
22q21 P
L
21q22 P
L
22q22
=
 PHq11 PLq12
PHq21 P
Lq22
.
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It is easy to confirm that SY X is a bona fide transition matrix. In summary, to solve
the model the parameters in Table 3.5 need to be estimated.
Table 3.5: Parameters/Variables to Be Estimated
Item Description
β Constant discount factor, time preference
γ Coefficient of relative risk aversion
θ Exogenous predetermined upper bound for the FOR
µY Long-run average annual aggregate income (detrended) y
δY Standard deviation of y (annual)
φY First-order autocorrelation coefficients of y (annual)
µX Long-run average aggregate dividend growth x
δX Standard deviation of x (annual)
φXk First-order autocorrelation coefficients of x for k: H,L. (annual)
The acceptable value for β based on different macroeconomic models ranges
from 0.95 to 0.99. I set β = 0.98 and let the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ
vary from 1 to 3. In the “Results” section of this chapter I show that, unlike in the
standard consumption based model, my model can get close to the equity risk
premium observed in U.S. data even for small values of risk aversion. The rest of
the parameters and variables are estimated as illustrated in Table 3.6.
3.4 Results
In this section, I show that the model can get close to the equity risk premium
observed in U.S. data while keeping the risk-free rate low. Table 3.7 summarizes the
results for different specifications of the model. As Table 3.7 suggests, the model
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Table 3.6: Estimated Values for Markov Processes
Parameter Estimation
µY 1.00
δY 0.06
φY = 1+ρy
2
= 1+0.64
2
= 0.82
µX 1.04
δX 0.07
φXk =
1+ρx
2
= 1+0.61
2
= 0.805
presented in this chapter outperforms the standard consumption model in explaining
the equity risk premium observed in the data. The equity premium puzzle states that
the mean excess return calculated in the standard consumption-based model is too
low unless the coefficient of relative risk aversion is implausibly high. For the standard
model this number is 20, which makes no economic sense. However, in this study,
the model generates an equity premium of 4.62% and the utility curvature is only 3.
This is consistent with the intuition of my model. In bad times, as consumption gets
closer to a household’s financial obligation, people become more risk averse (as they
have to pay back their obligations) and take on less risk. This leads to less investment
in the risky asset and eventually a higher equity risk premium.
Another advantage is that unlike the standard model, my model keeps the risk-free
rate relatively stable and low. For relative risk aversion between 1 and 3, the risk-free
rate induced by the model varies between 0.56% and 1.87%. This is true because
in my setup, as the coefficient of relative risk aversion increases, the precautionary
savings dominate the intertemporal substitution effect faster than in the standard
model and generate lower interest rates.
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Table 3.7: Results: Annual Returns
Risk Aversion Risk-Free Rate Equity Returns Equity Premium
Data 1 0.80 % 5.60 % 4.80 %
Mehra-Prescott model (1985)
1 4.82 % 4.95 % 0.13 %
3 7.97 % 8.46 % 0.49 %
Our model
1 1.87 % 2.38 % 0.51 %
3 0.56 % 5.17 % 4.62 %
3.4.1 Returns and the Utility Curvature
Figure 3.1 shows how the equity premium, risk-free rate, and equity returns vary
with the utility curvature γ. As γ increases, agents become more risk averse to any
bet. In this model, precautionary savings play an important role because households
are afraid of bad times during which the financial obligations ratio is high. Because
households are restricted by the borrowing constraint and cannot leverage further
because of the already-capped financial obligations ratio, they demand more of
precautionary savings (Treasury bond investments) to smooth their consumption for
bad states of the economy. This higher demand for risk-free bonds increases the
bond price qt and thus decreases the risk-free rate. The dotted line in Figure 3.1
shows the risk-free rates for different values of risk aversion between 1 and 3.
Having invested more in Treasury bonds, the demand for equity investment
decreases and the expected equity returns increase for higher values of γ. The
dashed line shows the equity returns for different values of risk aversion. Hence, by
generating higher equity returns and lower risk-free rates, the model gets close to
the equity risk premium observed in the data. The solid line shows the equity risk
premium generated by the model versus the different values for utility curvature.
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Figure 3.1: Expected Returns and the Coefficient of Risk Aversion
3.4.2 Expected Returns and the Borrowing Constraints
Figure 3.2 shows how the equity premium, the risk-free rate, and equity returns
vary with the household’s obligation ratio θ. Recall that the financial obligations
ratio is a direct indicator of the borrowing constraint in my model, so relaxing the
borrowing constraint is equivalent to increasing the household financial obligations
ratio cap θ. Figure 3.2 indicates that as the borrowing constraint is relaxed, the equity
risk premium shrinks, which is numerically consistent with results in Constantinides,
Donaldson, and Mehra (2002)[15].
The intuition is straight-forward. According to the financial obligations ratio
constraint (the borrowing constraint) in equation (3.2), households choose a debt
service level that caps their financial obligations ratio at anytime. Hence, as this θ
increases, agents can smooth their consumption much more easily via larger
borrowings. This leads to a decrease in the demand for precautionary savings
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Figure 3.2: Expected Returns and the Household Obligations Ratio
(Treasury bond investments), driving down bond prices qt and increasing the
risk-free rate. This is shown by the dotted line in Figure 3.2. Conversely, as θ
increases, households have more funding resources for their consumption purposes
and they can make more investments. The level of equity investment increases (as
more borrowing is consumed and the investment portfolio is more heavily weighted
toward equity investment rather than bond investment), leading to lower equity
returns. The dashed line shows equity returns for different values of θ. These two
effects decrease the equity premium as the level of θ increases, shown by the solid
line in Figure 3.2.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter addresses how, in an infinitely lived representative agent endowment
economy, household financial obligations affect the equity risk premium. The effect
is studied under two channels: the preference channel and the borrowing constraint
channel. The financial obligations ratio is a counter cyclical indicating variable that
affects agents’ marginal utility of consumption and reinforces its counter cyclicality
over business cycles. This is the driving force behind the model. I specify an explicit
Markov process for consumption growth in a non stationary environment, derive
the expected returns on equity and the risk-free bond and calculate the equity risk
premium in equilibrium. I show that in a reasonably calibrated economy, my model
can generate the equity premium observed in U.S. data.
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Chapter 4
FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS RATIO AND THE PREDICTABILITY OF
MARKET RETURNS
In this chapter, I test the predictability of excess market returns using the
household financial obligations ratio. Using U.S. stock market data from 1980 to
2015, I show that deviations of the household financial obligations ratio from its
long-run mean are a better forecaster of future market returns than the
dividend-price ratio, dividend-yield, earnings-price ratio, investment-capital ratio,
and other popular forecasting variables. The results remain significant using either
quarterly or annual data and are robust to out-of-sample tests.
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4.1 Introduction
The household financial obligations ratio is defined as total debt payments,
housing payments, and auto lease payments divided by total disposable income. It
is a macroeconomic counter cyclical variable that helps explain the equity risk
premium observed in U.S. data (Jahangiry, (2016b)[33]). Jahangiry (2016b) shows
that households’ financial obligations affect the equity risk premium via two
channels: the preference channel and the borrowing constraint channel. In his
set-up, individuals preferences are defined as consumption relative to financial
obligations. The framework is analogous to habit formation models where the
utility function depends on consumption relative to some habit level (Abel (1990)[1]
, Constantinides (1990), [24] and Campbell and Cochrane (1999)[6]). Conversely, in
an infinite-horizon aggregate household economy, the financial obligations ratio
represents the borrowing constraint because the agents’ borrowing capability is
limited by their financial obligations ratio in the model.
The mechanism by which the financial obligations ratio helps explain the equity
risk premium is straight-forward. In bad times when consumption is low, mostly
because of lower income and more borrowing incentives, the financial obligations ratio
is high. This dynamic borrowing constraint becomes binding in states of the economy
in which agents want to smooth consumption. Turning to the preference channel, in
good times when consumption is high, households slowly take on more debt. But
in bad times when consumption falls, households de-lever slowly. Thus, debt moves
slowly, following consumption, much like a slow-moving habit. Now imagine that
an agent has taken on specific level of debt he must repay. In recessions, as income
declines toward this specific level of debt, to make sure he can repay the debt, the
agent becomes more risk averse and takes on less risk. This decreases the demand
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for risky assets and increases the demand for precautionary savings in recessions.
During booms, however, consumption moves further away from slow-moving financial
obligations and hence the agent becomes less risk averse and takes on more risk. Thus,
lower ratio of consumption to financial obligation in recessions and the higher ratio
in good times directly affect the marginal utility and make the pricing kernel more
volatile. These two channels are the key elements of Jahangiry’s (2016b) model that
explain the equity risk premium.
It has also been documented that the risk associated with aggregate households
financial obligations is an economy wide risk and is significant in explaining
variations in the cross-section of stock returns (Jahangiry, (2016a)[32]).
Conditioning down on the financial obligations ratio, the FCAPM proposed by
Jahangiry (2016a), survives a wide range of classical econometric and diagnostic
tests when explaining the variations in average returns across 25 portfolios formed
based on size and the book-to-market ratio. The consistent pricing of financial
obligations risk with a negative risk premium suggests that the financial obligations
ratio acts as a state variable. The cross-sectional intuition is as follows: in bad
times, the financial obligations ratio is high and the marginal utility of consumption
is also high. Portfolios that pay off in these times are more valuable assets to
investors. The increase in hedging demands for these portfolios raises the prices and
hence implies a lower expected return. The negative risk premium delivers this
lower expected return.
In this study, I investigate the predictability of market returns/excess returns
using households’ obligations ratios, namely, debt service ratio and the financial
obligations ratio. For the last three decades there have been many efforts to identify
and establish the existence of time variation in expected asset returns; it is now
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widely accepted that excess returns are predictable by variables such as the
dividend-price ratio, earnings-price ratio, dividend-yield ratio, investment-capital
ratio, and other financial indicators. These financial variables have been successful
at predicting long-horizon returns but less successful at predicting short-horizon
returns. The dividend-price ratio, earnings-price ratio and all other predictive
variables are financial variables.
We are also interested in the relation between macroeconomic variables and
financial markets, mostly because expected returns appear to vary with business
cycles so that stock market returns should be forecastable by business cycle
variables at cyclical frequencies. One macroeconomic business cycle variable that is
successful at predicting returns at shorter horizon is the consumption-wealth ratio
(cay) proposed by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)[43]. Lettau and Ludvigson study
the role of fluctuations in the aggregate consumption-wealth ratio for predicting
stock returns. Using U.S. quarterly stock market data, they find that these
fluctuations in the consumption-wealth ratio are strong predictors of both real stock
returns and excess returns over a Treasury bill rate. However, the statistical
significance and predictive power of the consumption-wealth ratio is hump-shaped
and peaks at around one year. Indeed, the predictive power shrinks over long
horizons. In this study I show that mean deviations from the household financial
obligations ratio is another macroeconomic business cycle variable whose predictive
power is significant at short horizons and remains more significant over longer
horizons than does the consumption-wealth ratio.
But why should mean deviations from the household financial obligations ratio
have any predictive power? The economic intuition is as follows: in the early stages
of recessions, when returns are expected to be lower in the near future, households face
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the possibility that their obligation ratios will go above their long-run average. This
is because households’ obligations behave like a slow-moving habit (with a no-default
assumption, of course): in good times households taken on more financial obligations
for which they are responsible in bad times as well. This, along with negative income
shocks in recessions, eventually leaves households with a higher financial obligations
ratios. The opposite is true for good times. During booms, households receive positive
income shocks, which allows them to experience lower financial obligations ratios. 1
Hence, lower expected future returns followed by higher financial obligations ratios
and vice versa. This suggests that deviations in the financial obligations ratio from its
long-run mean should be negatively correlated with future returns, which is consistent
with what I find.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2, I present the data
and summary statistics. In Section 4.3 I test the predictability of market returns
with mean deviations from households financial obligations ratios. Sections 4.4 and
4.5 document the findings on long-horizon forecasts and on out-of-sample tests.
Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Data and Summary Statistics
A key advantage with respect to the data is that all the variables are directly
observable and there is no need to work with proxies. The data include stock market
returns and dividends per share from the Standard & Poor’s Composite Index. We
also consider returns on the value-weighted Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) Index as it provides a better and broader proxy for total asset wealth than
1Note that households’ obligations may increase during booms but higher income shocks will
offset these effects and the overall financial obligations ratio will be lower.
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does the S&P Composite Index. The data sources are summarized in Table 4.1.
Let rSP and rvw denote the market returns using the S&P Composite Index and
the value-weighted CRSP Index, respectively. Market excess return is denoted by
(rSP − rf ) where rf is the risk-free rate or the return on the one-month Treasury bill.
Table 4.1: Data Source
Variables Data Source
rSP , rvw, rf Center for Research in Security Prices
d/p, d/y, e/p Standard & Poor’s
cay Sdyney Ludvigson’s website
eqis, i/k Amit Goyal’s website
DSR, FOR, MKV/GDP Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Some of the most successful in-sample predictors that I compare with mean
deviations from the debt service ratio (DSR) and the financial obligations ratio
(FOR) are as follows. The dividend-price ratio (d/p) is the ratio of divided per
share over price. The dividend-yield (d/y) is the ratio of dividends over lagged
prices. 2 The earnings-price ratio (e/p) is the ratio of earnings over prices. I also
consider a successful corporate issuing activity variable, namely, percent equity
issuing (eqis), which is the ratio of equity issuing activity as a fraction of total
issuing activity. This variable is proposed in Baker and Wurgler (2000)[2].
MKV/GDP is the ratio of market value to GDP. i/k is the investment-to-capital
ratio, which is the ratio of aggregate (private nonresidential fixed) investment to
aggregate capital for the whole economy. This variable is proposed in Cochrane
2d/p and d/y studied in many articles (Ball (1978), Campbell (1987), Campbell and Shiller
(1988a, 1988b), Campbell and Viceira (2002), Campbell and Yogo (2006), the survey in Cochrane
(1997), Fama and French (1988), Hodrick (1992), Lewellen (2004), Menzly, Santos, and Veronesi
(2004), Rozeff (1984), Shiller (1984)).
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(1991)[9]. Finally, (cay) which is the Consumption-wealth ratio proposed in Lettau
and Ludvigson (2001)[43].
The properties of the above variables are well known, so I focus on the debt
service ratio (DSR) and the financial obligations ratio (FOR). Table 4.2 presents
summary statistics for these variables using annual data between 1980 and 2015.
Table 4.3 reports the same summary statistics using quarterly data between 1980Q1
and 2015Q4.
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics (Annual Data: 1980-2015)
rspt r
sp
t − rft DSRt FORt
Panel A : Correlation Matrix
rspt 1.00 0.977 -0.274 -0.221
rspt − rft 1.00 -0.246 -0.187
DSRt 1.00 0.967
FORt 1.00
Panel B: Univariate Summary Statistics
Mean 0.126 0.083 0.113 0.164
Standard error 0.166 0.161 0.009 0.009
Autocorrelation -0.012 -0.044 0.861 0.813
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics (Quarterly Data: 1980Q1-2015Q4)
rspt r
sp
t − rft DSRt FORt
Panel A : Correlation Matrix
rspt 1.00 0.993 -0.182 -0.151
rspt − rft 1.00 -0.169 -0.135
DSRt 1.00 0.966
FORt 1.00
Panel B: Univariate Summary Statistics
Mean 0.052 0.039 0.113 0.164
Standard error 0.082 0.081 0.009 0.008
Autocorrelation 0.100 0.077 0.978 0.966
In both Tables 4.2 and 4.3, DSRt and FORt are negatively correlated with excess
45
stock market returns. The means of DSRt and FORt are equal to 11.38% and 16.48%,
respectively, with standard deviations close to 1%. The debt service ratio and the
financial obligations ratio are persistent and the autocorrelation is high.
Figure 4.1 plots the standardized mean deviation of FORt and the standardized
excess return on the S&P Composite Index between 1980 and 2015. As discussed in
the previous section, large positive mean deviations preceded large negative excess
returns and vice versa. This trend is perceptible during U.S. recession periods,
namely: January 1, 1990 to March 1, 1991, March 1, 2001 to November 1, 2001, and
December 1, 2007 to June 1, 2009. 3
Figure 4.1: Excess Returns and Mean Deviations
A detailed discussion on derivation of DSR and FOR is provided in Chapter 2
and Appendix A. It is important to check that mean deviations from the financial
obligations ratio are stationary over time because expected returns appear to be
stationary over time, and the variables predicting these returns should be stationary
as well. Table 4.4 shows the ADF unit root test [16] and the KPSS test to confirm
this stationarity of the predicting variable.
3The standardized mean deviations of DSRt are substantially the same as those FORt.
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Table 4.4: Stationarity Tests for the Financial Obligations Ratio
ADF Test Statistic Prob.* KPSS Test Statistic
-3.522 0.014 0.1492
1 % level -3.671 0.739
5 % level -2.963 0.463
10 % level -2.621 0.347
As the ADF test statistic suggests, we can reject the null hypothesis (at p-values
greater than 1.5% at least), meaning that we can reject it if the financial obligations
ratio has a unit root property. The KPSS test statistic also confirm the stationarity
of this ratio as we could not reject the hypothesis that the financial obligations ratio
is stationary over time. 4
4.3 Forecasting Regressions
In this section, I investigate the predictive power of mean deviations from
households’ obligation ratios for asset returns/ excess returns. The dependent
variables are market returns (S&P500) and market excess returns. I also consider
returns on the value-weighted CRSP Index as it provides a better and broader
proxy for total asset wealth than does the S&P Composite Index. The independent
variable is the financial obligations ratio. For comparison purposes, I assess the
forecasting power of the most successful predicting variables using my sample data.
These variables are listed in Table 4.1, namely, dividend-price ratio (d/p),
dividend-yield ratio (d/y), earnings-price ratio (e/p), percent equity issuing (eqis),
investment-to-capital ratio (i/k), market-to-GDP ratio (MKT/GDP ), and
consumption-wealth ratio (cay). Table 4.5 summarizes the regression results and
4The results hold for the debt service ratio as well. Both the ADF and the KPSS tests for DSR
confirms the stationarity of the debt service ratio.
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reports one-period-ahead forecasts of the stock market returns. I correct for
generalized serial correlation of the residuals using the Newey-West (1987)
correction to the t-statistics.
Panels A, B, and C in Table 4.5 summarize the results of ordinary least squares
(OLS) Single regressions using S&P Composite Index returns, market excess
returns, and value-weighted market returns, respectively. As the table suggests, the
financial obligations ratio alone is significantly able to predict one-period-ahead
market returns. Note that the coefficients of DSR and FOR are both negative and
significant at 1% level in all three panels. These negative coefficients are consistent
with the economic intuition that laid out in “Introduction” section. As the economy
is hit by a negative income shock, the increasing financial obligations ratio is
followed by lower expected returns. The R2s are not worse than those generated by
the most successful competitive predicting variables in the literature. Indeed, both
obligation ratios have the highest R2s among all variables after the cay variable. In
next section I show that obligation ratios are even better than cay when doing
long-run regressions.
In Table 4.5, both the constants and coefficients of DSR, FOR, and cay are
significant at 1% level in panels A-C. The coefficient of the dividend-price ratio (d/p),
earnings-price ratio (e/p), and MKV/GDP are significant at the 10% level in Panels
A and C. The rest of the coefficients are not significant using either market returns
or market excess returns.
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Table 4.5: Forecasting One-Period-Ahead Returns (Single Regressions)
This table reports estimates from OLS single regressions of stock returns on variables
named in the column headings. The t-stats are Newey-West (1997) corrected.
Significant coefficients at 1% level are highlighted in bold-face. Regressions use data
from 1980 to 2015.
DSR FOR d/p d/y e/p eqis i/k MKV/GDP cay
Panel A: Market Returns (SP500)
Constant 0.124 0.123 0.013 0.042 0.027 0.087 0.350 0.185 0.100
t-stat 6.719 5.862 0.158 0.577 0.391 1.593 0.916 6.535 3.522
Coefficient -5.380 -4.743 4.101 2.757 1.633 0.230 -6.396 -0.052 4.451
t-stat -3.362 -2.038 1.798 1.577 1.857 1.057 -0.555 -1.869 2.936
R2 0.078 0.052 0.081 0.046 0.055 0.015 0.020 0.090 0.194
Adj.R2. 0.050 0.023 0.053 0.017 0.027 -0.015 -0.010 0.062 0.170
Panel B: Market Excess Returns
Constant 0.083 0.082 0.021 0.053 0.036 0.074 0.418 0.111 0.064
t-stat 8.025 5.085 0.260 0.730 0.518 1.420 1.192 4.025 2.185
Coefficient -4.425 -3.745 2.281 0.970 0.786 0.049 -9.452 -0.025 3.668
t-stat -2.976 -1.741 1.039 0.551 0.890 0.224 -0.897 -0.880 2.306
R2 0.054 0.033 0.026 0.006 0.013 0.001 0.044 0.021 0.136
Adj.R2. 0.026 0.004 -0.004 -0.024 -0.017 -0.030 0.015 -0.009 0.110
Panel C: Market Returns (CRSP vw)
Constant 0.127 0.126 0.014 0.044 0.027 0.087 0.341 0.189 0.103
t-stat 6.791 5.963 0.171 0.635 0.393 1.595 0.881 6.548 3.606
Coefficient -5.456 -4.845 4.190 2.782 1.679 0.245 -6.063 -0.053 4.482
t-stat -3.454 -2.103 1.925 1.685 1.905 1.115 -0.519 -1.889 2.965
R2 0.078 0.053 0.083 0.046 0.057 0.016 0.017 0.090 0.193
Adj.R2. 0.050 0.025 0.055 0.017 0.029 -0.014 -0.013 0.063 0.169
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To check the robustness of the results, as additional controls, Table 4.6 reports
the regressions of market returns and market excess returns on the variables shown
in the column headings of the table. Panel A reports estimates from OLS multiple
regressions of stock market returns on different combinations of the variables in the
table. The highest adjusted R2 is equal to 26.7% and is in row (4) where the
right-hand-side variables include the debt service ratio, dividend-price ratio and
consumption-wealth ratio. However, in row (4) the constant is not significant. The
only forecasting multiple regression in which all the coefficients are significant and
the constant is also significant at 1% level is where DSR and cay are the predictors
(row(1) in Panel A). Using these two variables alone generates an adjusted R2 of
23.51%, which is significantly higher that the R2 estimated by using either DSR or
cay individually.
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Table 4.6: Forecasting One-Period-Ahead Returns (Multiple Regressions)
This table reports estimates from OLS multiple regressions of stock returns on variables
named in the headings column. The t-stats are Newey-West (1997) corrected. Regressions
use data from 1980 to 2015. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
Constant DSR d/p e/p eqis i/k MKV/GDP cay R2 Adj.R2.
Panel A: Additional Controls; Market Returns
(1) 0.101*** -5.652** 4.543*** 0.2801 0.2351
(2) 0.081 -5.249* 0.790 4.373*** 0.2824 0.213
(3) -0.044 -6.828*** 2.815 0.053 5.784*** 0.313 0.222
(4) 0.110 -7.078*** 10.816*** 4.772** 0.353 0.267
(5) 0.070 -4.893** -0.269 0.657 4.519*** 0.285 0.189
(6) 0.436* -5.055* -1.355 1.256 -0.115 -10.013 5.061** 0.333 0.191
(7) 0.218 -6.621** 1.136 1.359 -0.232 -7.259 0.049 6.175*** 0.355 0.188
Panel B: Additional Controls; Excess Returns
(1) 0.064** -4.649* 3.744** 0.195 0.145
(2) 0.084 -5.045* -0.776 3.911*** 0.198 0.120
(3) -0.106 -7.451** 2.308 0.082* 6.062** 0.273 0.176
(4) 0.119 -7.259*** 11.361*** 4.395** 0.305 0.212
(5) 0.084 -5.027* -0.828 0.032 3.918*** 0.198 0.091
(6) 0.566** -5.201* -2.364 0.836 -0.136 -13.206* 4.64** 0.283 0.129
(7) 0.241 -7.535*** 1.348 0.989 -0.310 -9.103 0.074 6.307*** 0.333 0.161
In Panel B of Table 4.6, market excess returns are regressed on variations of the
predictors. As in Panel A, row (4) produces the highest adjusted R2 but again the
constant is not significant. Using DSR and cay alone eventuates in adjusted R2 =
14.5% and significant coefficients and constant (row (1)). In both panels, when all
predicting variables are included in row (7), the debt service ratio and consumption-
wealth ratio are the only forecasting variables that remain significant in one-period-
ahead multiple regressions. This reveals that DSR and cay contain information about
future asset returns that is not included in other forecasting variables.
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It is well known that some of the variables in Table 4.6 typically perform better at
forecast horizons in excess of two years. Thus I also examine the long-run analysis and
report the results in the “Long-Horizon Forecast” section in this chapter. Figure 4.2
plots the normalized —standard deviations of unity— market excess returns (ERP)
versus the nine variables listed in Table 4.5. The forecast horizon H is equal to 1 in
all graphs, indicating that the regressions are one-year-ahead forecasting regressions.
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4.4 Long-Horizon Forecasts
In earlier sections, I show that the household’s financial obligations ratio is
directly related to the interest rate. By construction, the higher the interest rate,
the higher the household’s financial obligations. This direct dependency suggests
that the financial obligations ratio should track longer-term fluctuations in asset
markets returns rather than provide accurate short-term forecasts. Further-more,
the summary statistics in Table 4.2 indicate that financial obligations ratios are
highly persistent, supporting the idea that these ratios should provide a more
accurate signal of long-term trends in asset returns than of short-term movements. 5
Table 4.7 reports the results of single regressions of H -period market returns and
market excess returns on different lagged forecasting variables over horizons
spanning one to seven years. The table presents estimated coefficients on the
included explanatory variables, R2s and the adjusted R2s, and the Newey-West
(1997) corrected t-statistics. The significant coefficients at 5% level are in bold-face.
In Panel A, and Panel C, the H -period market returns are predicted by lagged
values of forecasting variables listed in the column labeled “Regressors.” The
predictive power of financial obligations ratio (either DSR or FOR) is hump-shaped
and peaks at around period 6 with an adjusted R2 of 27.9%. The coefficients remain
almost constant and significant until period 6. This suggests that financial
obligations ratio is a relatively stronger predictor in long horizons than are other
hump-shaped variables such as the consumption-wealth ratio (cay), which peaks at
5This is like the dividend-price ratio and consumption-wealth ratio, which are both more accurate
in predicting long-term stock market returns.
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around period 2. As expected, the dividend-price ratio, dividend-yield ratio, and
earnings-price ratio perform significantly better in longer horizons; however, their
predictive power in one-year-ahead forecasts is weak (not a significant coefficients
with small adjusted R2). Panel B, and Panel D, reports the H -period forecasts
using market excess returns. As these panels suggest, the obligations ratios are not
as strong predictors as in panels A and C at very long horizons. The predictive
power of obligations ratio peaks at period 3 with an adjusted R2 equal to 12.30%.
The coefficients are significant at the 5% level until period 4. For the
consumption-wealth ratio, the results are the same as in panels A and C. The
predictive power peaks at period 2 and the coefficients are significant only up to this
period with an adjusted R2 of 21.20%. For the rest of the predicting variables, none
of the coefficients are significant at 5% level over any period between 1 and 7 years.
In my sample, the only variable that provides significant predictive power for excess
returns in longer horizons is the investment-capital ratio.
To test the robustness of the results, I consider additional controls by including
other predicting variables in the long-horizon regressions. I regress market returns
and market excess returns on variables including the household financial obligations
ratio (DSR), dividend-price ratio (d/p), earnings-price ratio (e/p), percent equity
issuing (eqis), investment-capital ratio (i/k), market value to GDP (MKV/GDP ),
and consumption-wealth ratio (cay). Table 4.8 reports the long-run
multiple-regression estimates. The table reports estimates from OLS multiple
regressions of stock returns on variables listed in the column labeled “Regressors.”
As Table 4.8 suggests, in all panels A-D, when including all the forecasting variables
together, the household obligations ratio (DSR) is the only predicting variables that
remains significant in all horizons spanning 1 to 7 periods. Whereas some variables
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are significant at shorter horizons, such as cay, others are significant at longer
horizons, such as d/p, e/p, eqis, and i/k. As in short-horizon regressions, this
significance of the debt service ratio in all horizons reveals that DSR contains
information about future asset returns that is not included in other forecasting
variables.
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Table 4.7: Long-Horizon Forecasts (Single Regressions)
Annual Data: 1980-2015
Forecast Horizon H
Row Regressors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Panel A: Stock Market Returns
Coefficient -5.380 -5.712 -5.932 -5.557 -5.271 -4.567 -3.939
1 DSR t-statistics -3.362 -5.501 -3.466 -3.476 -2.767 -1.831 -0.994
Adj.R2 0.050 0.135 0.223 0.235 0.261 0.279 0.240
Coefficient -4.743 -4.905 -5.067 -4.576 -4.525 -3.973 -3.477
2 FOR t-statistics -2.038 -3.020 -2.945 -2.578 -2.369 -1.739 -1.471
Adj.R2 0.023 0.076 0.132 0.126 0.156 0.172 0.150
Coefficient 4.101 4.112 3.910 4.045 4.300 4.031 3.979
3 d/p t-statistics 1.798 2.367 1.714 2.180 3.237 3.550 5.659
Adj.R2 0.053 0.134 0.194 0.282 0.417 0.517 0.611
Coefficient 2.757 3.071 3.268 3.278 3.217 3.257 3.218
4 d/y t-statistics 1.577 1.936 1.979 2.398 3.664 4.265 5.507
Adj.R2 0.017 0.085 0.169 0.232 0.287 0.426 0.509
Coefficient 1.633 1.521 1.544 1.417 1.285 1.105 1.211
5 e/p t-statistics 1.857 2.399 2.307 2.415 2.519 1.771 1.249
Adj.R2 0.027 0.067 0.123 0.138 0.145 0.153 0.236
Coefficient 0.230 0.327 0.341 0.341 0.330 0.310 0.264
6 eqis t-statistics 1.057 1.745 1.745 1.911 2.092 1.720 1.969
Adj.R2 -0.015 0.029 0.069 0.099 0.123 0.161 0.136
Coefficient -6.396 -7.603 -9.457 -10.435 -10.039 -9.974 -11.619
7 i/k t-statistics -0.555 -0.671 -1.033 -1.873 -2.583 -3.009 -4.167
Adj.R2 -0.010 0.025 0.099 0.172 0.199 0.260 0.360
Coefficient -0.052 -0.047 -0.042 -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 -0.046
8 MKV/GDP t-statistics -1.869 -1.777 -1.424 -1.370 -1.432 -1.203 -1.515
Adj.R2 0.062 0.117 0.144 0.160 0.196 0.271 0.401
Coefficient 4.451 4.389 3.647 3.190 2.288 1.662 1.282
9 cay t-statistics 2.963 2.761 2.284 2.404 2.098 2.989 1.398
Adj.R2 0.170 0.298 0.291 0.275 0.166 0.107 0.064
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Annual Data: 1980-2015
Forecast Horizon H
Row Regressors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Panel B: Market Excess Returns
Coefficient -4.425 -4.435 -4.336 -3.546 -2.983 -2.200 -1.645
1 DSR t-statistics -2.976 -4.496 -2.149 -1.806 -1.279 -0.752 -0.277
Adj.R2 0.026 0.079 0.123 0.097 0.087 0.066 0.034
Coefficient -3.745 -3.631 -3.530 -2.607 -2.272 -1.639 -1.236
2 FOR t-statistics -1.741 -2.581 -1.839 -1.543 -1.085 -0.631 -0.535
Adj.R2 0.004 0.033 0.059 0.028 0.027 0.014 -0.002
Coefficient 2.281 2.376 2.228 2.403 2.713 2.503 2.497
3 d/p t-statistics 1.039 1.357 0.898 1.124 1.876 1.836 3.131
Adj.R2 -0.004 0.029 0.051 0.100 0.196 0.262 0.338
Coefficient 0.970 1.392 1.627 1.693 1.695 1.798 1.798
4 d/y t-statistics 0.551 0.860 0.853 1.040 1.599 1.686 1.805
Adj.R2 -0.024 -0.005 0.025 0.051 0.080 0.161 0.214
Coefficient 0.786 0.750 0.826 0.726 0.594 0.419 0.551
5 e/p t-statistics 0.890 1.167 1.158 1.136 1.044 0.575 0.441
Adj.R2 -0.017 -0.005 0.018 0.021 0.015 0.002 0.046
Coefficient 0.049 0.154 0.175 0.185 0.180 0.162 0.105
6 eqis t-statistics 0.224 0.814 0.944 1.068 1.396 1.243 1.058
Adj.R2 -0.030 -0.016 -0.002 0.013 0.025 0.039 0.003
Coefficient -9.452 -10.034 -11.301 -11.803 -10.968 -10.302 -10.947
7 i/k t-statistics -0.897 -1.123 -1.706 -3.352 -5.528 -6.033 -4.905
Adj.R2 0.015 0.077 0.182 0.282 0.323 0.405 0.481
Coefficient -0.025 -0.020 -0.016 -0.014 -0.015 -0.017 -0.023
8 MKV/GDP t-statistics -0.880 -0.714 -0.500 -0.463 -0.547 -0.453 -0.559
Adj.R2 -0.009 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.011 0.041 0.127
Coefficient 3.668 3.599 2.843 2.378 1.506 0.989 0.734
9 cay t-statistics 2.306 2.096 1.521 1.611 1.220 1.618 0.922
Adj.R2 0.110 0.212 0.191 0.172 0.077 0.035 0.012
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Quarterly Data: 1980Q1-2015Q4
Forecast Horizon H
Row Regressors 1 2 4 8 12 24 36 48
Panel C: Stock Market Returns
Coefficient -1.805 -1.753 -1.876 -1.987 -2.027 -1.690 -1.188 -0.842
1 DSR t-stat -1.978 -1.764 -1.127 -1.701 -2.533 -3.061 -1.473 -0.819
Adj.R2 0.029 0.054 0.123 0.251 0.331 0.389 0.210 0.103
Coefficient -1.678 -1.613 -1.766 -1.866 -1.898 -1.629 -1.121 -0.781
2 FOR t-stat -1.696 -1.619 -1.006 -1.877 -2.704 -2.681 -1.068 -0.607
Adj.R2 0.020 0.038 0.094 0.193 0.257 0.319 0.171 0.100
Coefficient 2.050 2.040 1.871 1.692 1.700 1.557 1.324 1.136
3 d/p t-stat 3.136 3.057 2.094 1.791 2.169 5.322 5.815 4.875
Adj.R2 0.080 0.150 0.247 0.384 0.522 0.824 0.867 0.817
Coefficient 2.077 1.982 1.754 1.588 1.633 1.476 1.280 1.093
4 d/y t-stat 3.456 3.362 2.240 2.067 3.212 8.781 8.171 6.494
Adj.R2 0.087 0.149 0.228 0.356 0.510 0.784 0.855 0.798
Coefficient 0.866 0.814 0.733 0.613 0.629 0.512 0.544 0.458
5 e/p t-stat 2.272 2.044 1.626 2.393 2.455 1.936 2.986 3.021
Adj.R2 0.067 0.112 0.179 0.240 0.346 0.446 0.670 0.664
Coefficient -1.515 -1.655 -1.828 -2.317 -2.726 -2.809 -2.860 -2.090
6 i/k t-stat -0.805 -0.751 -0.709 -0.482 -0.866 -0.935 -1.995 -0.857
Adj.R2 -0.003 0.003 0.015 0.061 0.119 0.202 0.262 0.192
Coefficient 0.747 0.810 0.917 1.030 0.895 0.380 0.226 0.109
7 cay t-stat 2.568 2.867 2.367 1.880 1.534 1.128 0.548 0.234
Adj.R2 0.020 0.050 0.120 0.257 0.244 0.070 0.025 -0.003
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Quarterly Data: 1980Q1-2015Q4
Forecast Horizon H
Row Regressors 1 2 4 8 12 24 36 48
Panel D: Market Excess Returns
Coefficient -1.637 -1.559 -1.634 -1.657 -1.616 -1.100 -0.657 -0.434
1 DSR t-stat -1.845 -1.726 -1.048 -1.650 -2.811 -1.693 -1.079 -0.644
Adj.R2 0.023 0.043 0.099 0.200 0.259 0.243 0.099 0.040
Coefficient -1.481 -1.386 -1.491 -1.514 -1.481 -1.040 -0.626 -0.431
2 FOR t-stat -1.606 -1.435 -0.854 -1.604 -2.712 -1.652 -1.000 -0.533
Adj.R2 0.014 0.027 0.070 0.145 0.192 0.191 0.082 0.045
Coefficient 1.522 1.513 1.355 1.211 1.251 1.169 0.964 0.820
3 d/p t-stat 2.193 2.062 1.354 1.184 1.316 4.233 3.170 1.931
Adj.R2 0.042 0.082 0.135 0.224 0.349 0.692 0.746 0.712
Coefficient 1.558 1.461 1.243 1.111 1.187 1.090 0.928 0.783
4 d/y t-stat 2.374 2.204 1.373 1.288 2.037 5.564 4.624 3.748
Adj.R2 0.047 0.081 0.119 0.198 0.332 0.637 0.729 0.685
Coefficient 0.628 0.575 0.498 0.398 0.434 0.340 0.395 0.321
5 e/p t-stat 1.595 1.273 1.019 1.443 1.554 1.382 2.446 1.875
Adj.R2 0.033 0.055 0.085 0.113 0.202 0.291 0.574 0.545
Coefficient -2.508 -2.623 -2.719 -3.028 -3.257 -2.853 -2.612 -1.773
6 i/k t-stat -1.349 -1.231 -1.142 -0.754 -1.222 -3.009 -2.177 -1.060
Adj.R2 0.005 0.018 0.047 0.128 0.217 0.315 0.358 0.234
Coefficient 0.584 0.651 0.762 0.888 0.758 0.249 0.165 0.119
7 cay t-stat 1.986 2.177 1.914 1.669 1.359 0.996 0.505 0.348
Adj.R2 0.010 0.031 0.087 0.219 0.217 0.042 0.021 0.005
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Figure 4.3 plots the five-year market excess returns versus the lagged debt service
ratio mean deviations. Note that in this figure, the DSR mean deviations have
been flipped because the DSR coefficient is negative (as expected) in long-horizon
regressions. This figure shows how successful the household’s debt service ratio is in
predicting market excess returns over five-year horizon.
Figure 4.3: Debt Service Ratio: 1980-2015 Following Five-Year Returns
Finally, to see how the financial obligations ratio performs relative to other
variables in predicting long-horizon average returns, Figure 4.4 plots the normalized
market returns (SP500) versus the nine variables listed in Table 4.7. The forecast
horizon H is equal to 5 in all graphs, indicating that the regressions are the
five-year-ahead forecasting regressions.
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Table 4.8: Forecasting H -period-Ahead Returns (Multiple Regressions)
This table reports estimates from OLS multiple regressions of stock returns on variables
listed in the “Regressors” column. The t-stats are Newey-West (1997) corrected.
Regressions use data from 1980 to 2015. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
Forecast Horizon H
Regressors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Panel A: Additional Controls; Market Returns
Constant 0.219 0.281 0.392** 0.367*** 0.267*** 0.302*** 0.275***
DSR -6.622** -4.834*** -3.953*** -4.433** -7.889*** -6.602*** -3.839***
d/p 1.136 0.025 -1.258 1.311 6.008*** 5.819*** 5.549***
e/p 1.360 1.261 1.473 0.666 -0.554 -0.975*** -0.897**
eqis -0.232 0.043 0.135 0.010 -0.342** -0.301** -0.290***
i/k -7.260 -8.790 -11.052** -10.361*** -7.733*** -7.228*** -5.727***
MKV/GDP 0.050 0.040 0.026* 0.031*** 0.053*** 0.032** 0.006
cay 6.176*** 5.700*** 4.571*** 3.461** 1.807** 0.552 -0.117
Adjusted R2 0.188 0.468 0.630 0.697 0.778 0.839 0.835
Panel B: Additional Controls; Market Excess Returns
Constant 0.242 0.280 0.379** 0.361*** 0.268*** 0.302*** 0.278***
DSR -7.536*** -5.642*** -4.588*** -4.884*** -7.987*** -6.258*** -3.446***
d/p 1.348 0.235 -1.180 1.098 5.524*** 5.215*** 4.807***
e/p 0.990 1.005 1.309 0.575 -0.579* -0.992*** -0.841**
eqis -0.311 -0.042 0.055 -0.053 -0.386*** -0.327*** -0.314***
i/k -9.104 -10.099 -12.017*** -11.320*** -8.729*** -8.061*** -6.680***
MKV/GDP 0.074 0.065** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.070*** 0.045*** 0.019
cay 6.307*** 5.790*** 4.579*** 3.355*** 1.657** 0.425*** -0.144
Adjusted R2 0.161 0.444 0.596 0.648 0.726 0.750 0.688
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4.5 Out-of-Sample Tests
In this section, I study the out-of-sample performance of the household financial
obligations ratio by comparing the mean-squared error from one-period-ahead out-of-
sample forecasts obtained from a forecasting regression that includes the household
financial obligations ratio as the only forecasting variable, to forecasting regressions
that do not include it.
I need to choose the periods over which a regression model is estimated and
subsequently evaluated. Although any choice is necessarily ad hoc, the criteria are
clear. It is important to have enough initial data to get a reliable regression estimate
at the start of evaluation period, and it is important to have an evaluation period that
is long enough to be representative. Because annual data are limited, I investigate
quarterly periods as well. More specifically, we use one-third of the data to estimate
the regression models and the rest of the data to report out-of-sample results. I
consider a benchmark model and compare it with the out-of-sample performance
of financial obligations ratios, and then do some non-nested analysis comparing the
performance of the debt service ratio with other predicting variables mentioned earlier
in this chapter. The benchmark model is the historical mean benchmark.
In the historical mean benchmark, a constant is the sole explanatory variable for
excess returns. It has been documented (Welch and Goyal (2008)[59]) that most
of the predicting variables in the literature have no ability to predict out-of-sample
returns relative to a historical mean model despite their ability to do so in sample.
Therefore, in this chapter, I also produce Welch-Goyal type figures to see the out-
of-sample performance of the financial obligations ratio relative to historical mean
models.
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4.5.1 Out-Of-Sample Empirical Procedure
I closely follow Welch and Goyal’s (2008)[59] empirical procedure. The out-of-
sample forecast uses only the data available up to the time at which the forecast is
made. Let eB denote the vector of expanding out-of-sample errors from the benchmark
model and eA denote the vector of expanding out-of-sample errors from the OLS
conditional model. The out-of-sample statistics are:
R2 = 1− MSEA
MSEB
∆RMSE =
√
MSEB −
√
MSEA
MSE-F = (T − h+ 1)
(
MSEB−MSEA
MSEA
)
.
R2 is the out-of-sample R-squared (OOS-R2). MSEA = E[e
2
A] is the mean-squared
forecasting error from the relevant conditional model. MSEB = E[e
2
B] is the mean-
squared error from the benchmark model. RMSE is the root mean-squared error
and ∆RMSE is the difference between the benchmark forecast and the conditional
forecast for the same sample/forecast period. Positive numbers for ∆RMSE indicate
superior out-of-sample conditional forecast. MSE-F is a test statistics designed to
determine whether the one-step-ahead forecasting performance from the benchmark
model is statistically different from the conditional model. It is an out-of-sample F-
type test developed by McCracken (2007)[48]. h is the degree of overlap. The MSE-F
test is a test of equal mean-squared forecasting error. The null hypothesis is that the
conditional model (model 1) and the benchmark models (model 2) have equal mean-
squared error. The alternative hypothesis is that the benchmark model (model 2)
has higher mean-squared error than conditional model (model 1). When the financial
obligations ratio models are compared with other conditional models, the debt service
ratio model is model 1 and each of the other predicting variable models is model 2
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separately.
I compare the out-of-sample performance of financial obligations ratio with other
conditional models by providing figures such as those in Welch and Goyal
(2008)[59]. These figures graph the in-sample and out-of-sample performance of
conditional models.
For the in-sample regressions, the performance is the cumulative squared
demeaned returns minus the cumulative squared regression residual. For the
out-of-sample regressions, this is the cumulative squared prediction errors of the
prevailing mean minus the cumulative squared prediction error of the predictive
variable from the linear historical regression. In the figures, whenever a line
increases, the conditional model predicted better; whenever it decreases, the historical
mean model predicted better. The units in the graphs are not intuitive, but the time
series pattern allows diagnosis of years with good or bad performance. Indeed, the
final ∆SSE statistic in the OOS plot is sign-identical with the ∆RMSE statistic in
our tables. In these figures, we can easily adjust perspective to see how variations in
starting or ending date would impact the conclusion by shifting the graph up or down
(redrawing the y = 0 horizontal zero line). The plots have also vertically shifted the
IS errors, so that the IS line begins at zero on the date of our first OOS prediction. 6
Table 4.9 summarizes the out-of-sample results. Panels A and B use annual data,
the initial estimation period begins in 1980 and ends in 2000. The out-of-sample
estimation period is equal to 20, which is equal to the number Welch and Goyal
(2008) used in their tables. The model is recursively re-estimated until the 2015.
Out-of-sample tests are performed for three overlapping horizons. I consider two-year
6Welch and Goyal 2008[59]
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and three-year overlapping horizons to capture business cycle fluctuations. Panels
C and D report quarterly data. The out-of-sample estimation period here is equal
to 48, which is one-third of the number of periods in the full sample. In Panels C
and D, I report out-of-sample results for one-quarter, four-quarter, and eight-quarter
overlapping horizons.
As Table 4.9 reports, the mean-squared forecasting error of the household
financial obligations ratio model (either DSR or FOR) is always lower than that of
the historical mean benchmark model except for the column where out-of-sample
market excess returns are predicted using one-year returns (H = 1).7 In Panels C
and D, where quarterly data are used, OOS-R2 is always positive and the MSE-F
statistic strongly rejects the null hypothesis. This suggests that information about
the aggregate household financial obligations ratio consistently improves forecasts
over models that use only a constant as a predictive variable. In all panels, as the
number of overlapping horizons is expanded, both in-sample and out-of-sample R2s
increase and MSE-F statistics become stronger. This is consistent with what is
found in the long-horizon analysis in the previous section.
Table 4.10 compares statistics on the out-of-sample performance of the debt service
ratio versus other conditional models using different predicting variables, namely, d/p,
d/y, e/p, i/k, eqis, MKV/GDP , and cay. 8 The comparison is done using stock
market return (Panel A for annual frequencies and Panel C for quarterly frequencies)
and market excess return (Panel B for annual frequencies and Panel D for quarterly
frequencies) forecasts. A ratio of mean-squared errors MSE1/MSE2 less than one
7The MSE-F tests are not significant when using annual data and H = 1. This is expected as
the number of out-of-sample periods and the valuation periods do not seem to be sufficiently large.
8I do not have quarterly data for eqis and MKV/GDP so I exclude these variables when reporting
results using quarterly data (Panels C and D of Table 4.10).
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Table 4.9: Out-of-Sample Tests
This table presents statistics on forecast errors in-sample (IS) and out-of-sample (OOS) for
stock market return (Panels A for annual frequencies and Panel C for quarterly frequencies)
and market excess return (Panel B for annual frequencies and Panel D for quarterly
frequencies) forecasts. H is the number of overlapping horizons in each panel. OOS-R2,
∆RMSE, and MSE-F are explained in the text.
Annual Data: 1980-2015, OOS Estimation Period=20
H =1 H =2 H =3
DSR FOR DSR FOR DSR FOR
Panel A: Stock Market Returns
IS R2 0.050 0.023 0.135 0.076 0.223 0.132
OOS R2 0.019 0.015 0.143 0.095 0.293 0.196
∆RMSE 0.002 0.001 0.011 0.007 0.019 0.013
MSE-F 0.310 0.239 2.329 1.468 4.969 2.932
Panel B: Market Excess Returns
IS R2 0.026 0.004 0.079 0.033 0.123 0.059
OOS R2 -0.040 -0.043 0.061 0.026 0.158 0.093
∆RMSE -0.004 -0.004 0.004 0.002 0.009 0.005
MSE-F -0.617 -0.662 0.917 0.377 2.246 1.237
Quarterly Data: 1980Q1-2015Q4, OOS Estimation Period=48
H =1 H =4 H =8
DSR FOR DSR FOR DSR FOR
Panel C: Stock Market Returns
IS R2 0.029 0.020 0.123 0.094 0.251 0.193
OOS R2 0.029 0.022 0.156 0.122 0.249 0.189
∆RMSE 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004
MSE-F 2.886 2.191 16.620 12.492 27.165 19.067
Panel D: Market Excess Returns
IS R2 0.023 0.014 0.099 0.070 0.200 0.145
OOS R2 0.023 0.017 0.131 0.096 0.212 0.154
∆RMSE 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003
MSE-F 2.295 1.637 13.540 9.603 21.998 14.905
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indicates that the mean-squared forecasting error of the DSR is lower than that
of the conditional model. Annual data and quarterly data both suggest that when
MSE-F is significant, the DSR forecasting model contains information that produces
(almost always) superior forecasts to those produced by any of the other models. For
longer overlapping horizons, this is always the case, suggesting that forecasts using the
financial obligations ratio are consistently superior to forecasts using other popular
forecasting variables.
Figure 4.5 graphs the in-sample and out-of-sample performance of the debt
service ratio augmented model using annual data (the three graphs on the left) and
quarterly data (the three graphs on the right) for different overlapping horizons. For
the in-sample regressions, the performance is the cumulative squared de-meaned
returns minus the cumulative squared regression residual. For the out-of-sample
regressions, the performance is the cumulative squared prediction errors of the
prevailing mean minus the cumulative squared prediction error of the predictive
variable from the linear historical regression. In this figure, whenever a line
increases, the DSR-augmented model predicts better; whenever it decreases, the
historical mean model predicts better. The final ∆SSE statistic in the
out-of-sample plot is sign-identical to the ∆RMSE statistic in our tables. The
figure adjusts the perspective to see how variations in the starting or ending date
affects the conclusion by shifting the graph up or down (redrawing the y = 0
horizontal zero line). The plots also vertically shift the in-sample errors so that the
in-sample line begins at zero on the date of the first out-of-sample prediction (1980
for annual data and 1980’0 for quarterly data). As Figure 4.5 suggests, the
performance of the DSR-augmented model is consistent with Table 4.9. As the
number of overlapping horizons is increased, the out-of-sample performance become
closer to in-sample performance.
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Table 4.10: Out-of-Sample Comparisons
This table compares statistics on OOS performance of debt service ratio versus a conditional
model. The comparison is done using stock market return (Panel A for annual frequencies
and Panel C for quarterly frequencies) and market excess return (Panel B for annual
frequencies and Panel D for quarterly frequencies) forecasts.
Annual Data: 1980-2015, OOS Estimation Period=20
H =1 H =2 H =3
MSE1/MSE2 MSE-F MSE1/MSE2 MSE-F MSE1/MSE2 MSE-F
Panel A: Stock Market Returns
DSR vs. d/p 1.052 -0.794 0.980 0.286 0.920 1.046
DSR vs. d/y 0.928 1.244 0.873 2.042 0.867 1.849
DSR vs. e/p 1.039 -0.599 0.926 1.118 0.838 2.321
DSR vs. eqis 0.983 0.276 0.904 1.491 0.805 2.901
DSR vs. i/k 0.927 1.267 0.804 3.422 0.774 3.495
DSR vs. MKV/GDP 0.800 4.001 0.769 4.197 0.674 5.803
DSR vs. cay 1.198 -2.649 1.195 -2.287 1.044 -0.509
Panel B: Market Excess Returns
DSR vs. d/p 0.980 0.329 0.896 1.627 0.850 2.117
DSR vs. d/y 0.865 2.504 0.804 3.404 0.791 3.169
DSR vs. e/p 1.002 -0.035 0.907 1.430 0.848 2.154
DSR vs. eqis 0.974 0.419 0.908 1.411 0.847 2.164
DSR vs. i/k 1.003 -0.046 0.947 0.786 1.079 -0.882
DSR vs. MKV/GDP 0.721 6.183 0.691 6.250 0.636 6.872
DSR vs. cay 1.104 -1.511 1.068 -0.894 0.953 0.587
Quarterly Data: 1980Q1-2015Q4, OOS Estimation Period=48
H =1 H =4 H =8
MSE1/MSE2 MSE-F MSE1/MSE2 MSE-F MSE1/MSE2 MSE-F
Panel C: Stock Market Returns
DSR vs. d/p 1.044 -4.085 1.113 -9.148 1.198 -13.549
DSR vs. d/y 1.049 -4.475 1.119 -9.575 1.183 -12.700
DSR vs. e/p 1.046 -4.192 1.033 -2.896 0.975 2.083
DSR vs. i/k 0.950 5.056 0.837 17.568 0.759 26.037
DSR vs. cay 0.998 0.188 1.013 -1.166 1.052 -4.086
Panel D: Market Excess Returns
DSR vs. d/p 1.003 -0.291 0.991 0.815 1.008 -0.626
DSR vs. d/y 1.004 -0.388 0.994 0.546 0.992 0.686
DSR vs. e/p 1.008 -0.767 0.951 4.679 0.886 10.579
DSR vs. i/k 0.968 3.213 0.909 9.028 0.878 11.432
DSR vs. cay 0.987 1.296 0.984 1.505 1.036 -2.872
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Figure 4.6 graphs the in-sample and out-of-sample performance of each conditional
model separately. The conditional model relies on predictive variables noted in each
graph. The benchmark is the historical mean model. The interpretation of the
increase and decrease in the lines is the same as in Figure 4.5. In Figure 4.6, I show
only the graphs where stock market annual returns (SP500) are used, the out-of-
sample estimation period equals 20, and the overlapping horizon equal one (H =1).
The H performance of each model is closer to it’s in-sample performance if the solid
line and the dashed line are closer to each other. The figure suggests that financial
obligations ratio, cay, e/p, and eqis augmented models perform relatively better than
the other conditional models.
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Figure 4.5: Out-of-Sample Performance of the DSR-Augmented Model
These graphs plot the in-sample and out-of-sample performance of the DSR-augmented
model. Each line is cumulative squared prediction errors of the historical mean model
minus the cumulative squared prediction error of the DSR-augmented model. The in-
sample prediction-relative performance is the solid line and the out-of-sample prediction-
relative performance is the dashed line. An increase in a line indicates better performance
of the named model; a decrease in a line indicates better performance of the historical mean
model.
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4.6 Conclusion
Using annual and quarterly data from 1980 to 2015, I show that the household
financial obligations ratio can predict market returns at short horizons and over
business cycle frequencies. The debt service ratio is a macroeconomic business cycle
variable that is a better forecaster of future returns both in-sample and
out-of-sample than the dividend-price ratio, dividend-yield, earnings-price ratio,
investment-capital ratio, and other popular forecasting variables. I conduct multiple
regression analyses using some of the most successful predicting variables in the
literature for forecasting one-period-ahead returns and find that the debt service
ratio and the consumption-wealth ratio are the only forecasting variables that
remain significant in these regressions. This indicates that the debt service ratio
contains information about future asset returns that is not included in other
forecasting variables. I also conduct out-of-sample tests and find that information
about the aggregate household financial obligations ratio consistently improves
forecasts over models that use only a constant as a predictive variable and over
other conditional models that use popular forecasting variables.
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Chapter 5
FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS RATIO AND THE CROSS-SECTION OF STOCK
RETURNS
This chapter examines whether the risk associated with the aggregate
households’ financial obligations is an economy-wide risk and thus significant for
explaining the variation in the cross-section of stock returns. The multifactor model
proposed is a modification of the CAPM that includes the financial obligations ratio
as a conditioning down variable. The household financial obligations ratio is defined
as the ratio of all debt payments and financial commitments over total disposable
income. The FCAPM examined in this chapter survives a wide range of classical
econometric tests using data from 1980 to 2015. The model performs well in
explaining the variation in average returns across 25 portfolios formed based on size
and the book-to-market ratio. The Hansen-Jagannathan (1994) distance associated
with the FCAPM is calculated and compared to some other conditional and
unconditional models. The consistent pricing of financial obligation risk with a
negative risk premium suggests that the financial obligations ratio acts as a state
variable.
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5.1 Introduction
In an infinitely lived aggregate household endowment economy, Jahangiry
(2016b)[33] explores the effect of a household’s financial obligations ratio on the
equity risk premium. In the partial equilibrium model he proposes, households’
preferences are defined as their consumption relative to financial obligations which
also appear as a borrowing constraint in the model. The household financial
obligations ratio is defined as the ratio of all debt payments and financial
commitments over households’ total disposable income. The financial obligations
ratio is a counter-business-cycle macroeconomic variable that tends to increase in
recessions and decrease in booms (Dynan (2012, 2013), Johnson and Li (2007,
2010)). These obligations affect an individual’s marginal utility of consumption and
reinforce its counter cyclicality over business cycles. In equilibrium, households’
decisions regarding their financial obligation and consumption levels are the driving
forces in Jahangiry’s model in explaining the observed equity risk premium in the
data.
In this chapter, I examine whether the risk associated with the aggregate
households’ financial obligations is an economy-wide risk and thus significant for
explaining the variation in the cross-section of stock returns. As has been well
documented, the standard consumption-based asset pricing model performs poorly
in explaining the cross-section variations of expected returns.1 The FCAPM is an
extension of the CAPM that uses the financial obligations ratio as a conditioning
down variable. The FCAPM can be derived in different ways. One could follow the
1However, Jagannathan and Wang (2005)[31] show that, working with Christmas to Christmas
consumption data, there is still hope that standard consumption data can explain the cross-sectional
variations in excess returns.
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conditional CAPM approach of Jagannathan and Wang (1996)[30] to derive the
multifactor model proposed in this chapter. The conditioning variable would be
financial obligations. Another approach is to approximate the stochastic discount
factor (SDF) using a linear model. Either way, one gets the same model.
But what is the intuition behind thinking of financial obligations as a conditioning
down factor? Or in other words, why am I willing to show that this extra risk
associated with financial obligations is priced across different portfolios of assets? In
the context of asset pricing, the counter cyclicality of financial obligations ratio is
important because I am looking for a conditioning down variable that is correlated
with business cycles, especially with bad times. The intuition is straight-forward:
financial obligations are contractual obligations and must be made regardless of the
realized state of the economy. Only residual income can be used to make consumption-
investment decisions. This would make, ceteris paribus, a marginal investor with a
higher financial obligations ratio more risk averse compared to a marginal investor
with a lower financial obligations ratio. Therefore, the former marginal investor would
be willing to pay more for holding assets that pay off when the financial obligations
ratio is high; that is, he would demand lower expected returns for the equities that
have a positive correlation with financial obligations. Thus, if financial obligations
risk turns out to be an economy-wide aggregate risk to which everybody must pay
attention, then the price of this risk can be expected to be significant in explaining
the expected returns across different assets.
Empirical testing is done by using annual/quarterly data for 1980-2015. I show
that differences in exposure to financial obligations risk, along with exposure to
market risk, could explain the cross-sectional differences in average excess returns
across the 25 benchmark equity portfolios formed based on size and the
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book-to-market ratio. The explanatory power of the financial obligations ratio as a
conditioning down variable is tested using a wide range of econometric tests and
various techniques, including cross-sectional regression (OLS and generalized least
squares (GLS)), the Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach, and generalized methods of
moments (GMM). However, one caveat of testing factor models is that as the
sample size increases, almost every multifactor model is rejected, as the model test
statistic blows up with lower standard errors for the cross-sectional residuals. To
avoid this issue, I use different diagnostic tests along with the classical econometric
test to test the FCAPM. These tests include the “actual versus fitted expected
returns plot,” “firm-specific characteristics test,” and “testing for priced factors.”
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 5.2, I set up the model
and discuss the derivation of the FCAPM. In Section 5.3, I review the data. I explain
estimation procedures in Section 5.4 and present the results in Section 5.5. Section
5.6 concludes.
5.2 The Multifactor Model
The FCAPM presented in this chapter can be derived in different ways. One is to
follow the conditional CAPM approach used by Jagannathan and Wang (1996)[30].
The conditioning down variable used in this chapter would be the financial obligations
ratio. Another way is to start with a no arbitrage assumption and impose a minimal
theoretical structure. In the absence of arbitrage there exists an SDF that prices
all the traded assets in the economy (Harrison and Kreps (1979))[29]. Then I could
approximate the SDF by using a linear model. Using either approach, I get the
same multifactor model. Because the focus in this study is on testing the empirical
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significance of the financial obligations ratio in the cross-section of expected returns,
I do not take a stand on which approach to use.
5.2.1 Financial Obligations Ratio as a Conditioning Down Variable
In a conditional model, its parameters vary over time. A classic example is the
conditional CAPM where expected returns depend on conditional betas times the
conditional factor risk premium:
Et(R
ei
t+1) = βitλMt, (5.1)
where λMt is the market risk premium. Translating equation (5.1) into discount
factor language, there maybe a discount factor m that is a linear function of the
market return and the parameters of the model that vary over time:
mt+1 = at + btR
M
t+1 ⇐⇒ Et(mt+1Reit+1) = 0. (5.2)
The problem of working with a model that has time-varying parameters is that
when testing the model, equation (5.2) cannot be conditioned down using a
managed portfolio, that is,
0 = Et(mt+1R
ei
t+1) = Et
[
(at + btR
M
t+1)R
ei
t+1
] 6⇒ 0 = E [(a+ bRMt+1)Reit+1] .
In words, a conditional model does not imply an unconditional model.2 Conversely,
however, an unconditional model implies a conditional model. To test an
2Jagannathan and Wang (1996)[30] illustrate this concept through the following example:
Consider a hypothetical economy in which the CAPM holds period by period. Suppose that
the econometrician considers only two stocks and that there are only two possible types of dates
in the world. The betas of the first stock in the two date-types are, respectively, 0.5 and 1.25
(corresponding to an average beta of 0.875). The corresponding betas of the second stock are 1.5
and 0.75 (corresponding to an average beta of 1.125). Suppose that the expected risk premium on
the market is 10 percent on the first date and 20 percent on the second date. Then, if the CAPM
holds in each period, the expected risk premium on the first stock will be 5 percent on the first
date and 25 percent on the second date. The expected risk premium on the second stock will be 15
percent on both dates. Hence, an econometrician who ignores the fact that betas and risk premiums
vary over time will mistakenly conclude that the CAPM does not hold, since the two stocks earn an
average risk premium of 15 percent, but their average betas differ.
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unconditional model, the best I can do is to express the time-varying parameters of
the model (at, bt) in terms of a conditioning variable zt, an instrument that is
driving the conditioning information. I model the conditioning information as
below:
mt+1 = a(zt) + b(zt)R
M
t+1, (5.3)
where a(zt) and b(zt) are assumed to be linear in Zt:
a(zt) = a0 + a1Zt b(zt) = b0 + b1Zt,
The SDF can be rewritten as,
mt+1 = a0 + a1Zt + b0R
M
t+1 + b1ZtR
M
t+1. (5.4)
With this new pricing kernel, to test the model I can take the unconditional
expectation from equation (5.2) because a0, a1, b0, b1 are constant. Thus, a
conditional model plus one information variable zt is equivalent to an unconditional
multifactor model. More generally, any conditional model can be written as a larger
unconditional factor model.3
In this chapter, market return is used as a proxy for the universe of risky assets.
Note that unlike Jagannathan and Wang (1996)[30], I exclude human capital from
the universe of risky assets because the return on human capital is indirectly part
3Jagannathan and Wang (1996)[30] work with the conditional CAPM. They show that the
conditional CAPM implies an unconditional three-factor model. They call it the premium-labor
(P-L) model as it includes human capital as a proxy for the universe of risky assets. The P-L model
is given by:
Et(Rt+1) = α+ βpremR
prem
t + βvwR
vw
t+1 + βLR
L
t+1,
where Rprem is the spread between Baa and Aaa bonds and is used as a proxy to capture time
variation in the expected market risk premium. Rvw is the return on the market and RL is the
return on human capital.
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of the model and is captured by the financial obligations ratio.4 In my model the
conditioning down variable is the financial obligations ratio Ft. Replacing Z with F
in equations (5.3) and (5.4) and using a first-order approximation gives the SDF in
(5.5). This is an approximation as I ignore the interactions between the conditioning
variable and market returns as the only factor:
mt+1 ≈ δ0 + δ1RMt+1 + δ2Ft. (5.5)
The multi-beta representation of equation (5.5) is given in (5.6):
Et(Ri,t+1) = αi + βiMλM + βiFλF . (5.6)
Here λM and λF are the prices of market risk and financial obligations risk,
respectively. Although βiM is the standard market beta, I define βiF , the financial
obligations beta as below:
βiF =
Cov(Ri,t+1, Ft+1)
V ar(Ft+1)
.
The intuition behind using the financial obligations ratio as a conditioning down
variable has implications for λF , which I explain in detail in the next section.
5.2.2 Intuition, Portfolio Perspective
Let us look at the portfolio logic of how the FCAPM works. Consider two assets,
A and B. They have the same means, same standard deviations, and same betas for
4Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)[43] also work with the conditional CAPM to explain the cross-
section of average returns. They do not include labor income in the proxy for market. They use the
log of the consumption-wealth ratio as a conditioning variable and find:
...We demonstrate that such conditional models perform about as well as the Fama-French three-
factor model on portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market characteristics. The conditional
consumptio CAPM can account for the difference in returns between low-book-to market and high-
book-to-market portfolios and exhibits little evidence of residual size or book-to-market effects.
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the market portfolio. Therefore, they must yield the same expected returns. For an
investor, assets A and B look identical and he could split his portfolio between the two.
Assume that in a recession, the investor is likely to face a higher financial obligations
ratio, either because of greater likelihood of losing his job or more borrowing incentives
to smooth consumption, or both. Also assume that in a recession, stock A goes up
and stock B goes down. In time-series regression language,
Reit = ai + βiMR
eM
t + 
i
t. (5.7)
This implies that in a recession, asset A has a positive residual (At > 0) and asset B
has a negative residual (Bt < 0); that is, their risks occur at different times. Knowing
these conditions, the investor is expected to buy stock A because stocks A and B are
no longer identical. A stock that goes up when the financial obligations ratio is high
(in bad times), is a good stock to own. Conversely for stock B, the investor wants to
get rid of it as soon as possible because he does not want to lose money at the same
time he loses his job and faces a higher financial obligations ratio. Now go further
and imagine a situation where everybody does this. What is going to happen if many
investors try to buy stock A and sell stock B? It will increase the price of stock A and
drive down its expected returns. Similarly, because everybody wants to sell stock B,
the price of stock B goes down and its expected return goes up.
Therefore, in equilibrium, it is no longer true that the expected returns depend
only on the market betas (E(Rei) = βiλM). This tendency to provide insurance
against a high financial obligations ratio emerges. Expected returns depend on the
market portfolio but also on their tendency to go up and down when financial
obligations are high. Therefore, what was a in equation (5.7) now shows up as betas
with respect to another factor. In terms of time-series regressions:
Reit = βiMR
eM
t + βiFFt + 
i
t, (5.8)
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and the expected returns now looks like:
E(Rei) = βiMλM + βiFλF + αi. (5.9)
Intuitively, this financial obligations ratio F is a state variable. The news of future
high ratios is bad. If investors can identify stocks that reliably go up upon news that
there will be a high F in the future, they would want to buy those stocks. One final
note is that because I am working with an aggregate financial obligations ratio in
this model, there is an aggregate hedging demand for F, and therefore it qualifies
as a factor to move prices around. In other words, the risk associated with financial
obligations is an economy-wide risk. The question I address in this chapter is whether
this extra risk is priced in historical data for cross-sectional returns. I use the returns
of 25 portfolios formed based on size and the book-to-market ratio to test whether
these returns are priced by the model in (5.9).
5.3 Data
The data used in this chapter are summarized in Table 5.1. One key advantage
of the FCAPM model with respect to data is that all the variables and factors are
directly observable.
Portfolios returns are the left-hand-side variables in the model. The portfolios
include all stocks listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. Portfolios are formed
using a two-way sort. Size sorting is based on market capitalization. At the end of
June each year, stocks are ranked according to their market capitalization quintiles.
These quintiles form a set of five portfolios. Book-to-Market sorting is done according
to the ratio of book to market equity. The ratio is book equity for the last fiscal year
divided by market equity. The book-to-market ratio breakpoints are the 20th, 40th,
60th, and 80th percentiles. These breakpoints are used to form another set of five
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Table 5.1: Data Source
Variables Data Source
25 portfolios formed on size and book-to-market Kenneth French’s website
Fama-French (1993) three factors (Mkt, smb, hml) Kenneth French’s website
S&P composite prices and dividends Robert J. Shiller data
One-month T-bill returns Center for Research in Security Prices
Household financial obligations ratio Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
portfolios. The intersection of these two sets produces 25 portfolios used as the
dependent variables in this study.
The financial obligations ratio and market portfolio returns are used as the right-
hand-side variables in the model to explain the cross-section of expected returns across
these 25 portfolios. Market returns are value-weighted returns on CRSP stock market
indexes (NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ-ARCA). A detailed discussion of the derivation of
financial obligations ratio is provided in Chapter 2 and Appendix A.
It is important to check that my conditioning down variable is stationary because
returns are stationary over time and the variables used to explain these returns should
be stationary as well. Table 5.2 shows the ADF unit root test along with the KPSS
test to confirm the stationarity of the conditioning variable. As the ADF test statistic
suggests, the null hypothesis can be rejected at p-values greater than 1.5%, implying
that it can be rejected that financial obligations ratio has a unit root property. The
KPSS test statistic also confirm the stationarity of this ratio, as the hypothesis that
financial obligations ratio is stationary over time cannot be rejected.5
5 The ADF null is “H0 = Ft has a unit root” and the KPSS null is “H0 = Ft is stationary.”
84
Table 5.2: Stationarity Tests for the Financial Obligations Ratio
ADF Test Statistics Prob.* KPSS Test Statistics
-3.522 0.014 0.1492
1% level -3.671 0.739
5% level -2.963 0.463
10% level -2.621 0.347
5.4 Estimation Procedure
The model that I estimate in this chapter is:
E(Rei) = γ + βiMλM + βiFλF + αi, (5.10)
where γ is the intercept and αi are the model errors. λM is the market risk premium
and λF is the financial obligation risk premium. βiM and βiF are market beta and
financial obligation beta and are defined as:
βiM =
Cov(Ri,t+1, R
M
t+1)
V ar(RMt+1)
, βiF =
Cov(Ri,t+1, Ft+1)
V ar(Ft+1)
.
Finally, E(Rei) are the average returns of 25 size and book-to-market portfolios to
be explained by the FCAPM in (5.10). In this section, I discuss in detail how to
estimate α, β, and λ; how to calculate the standard deviations of these estimates;
and how to test the central prediction of the model that alphas should be zero. 6
To do so, I use classic linear regression tests, including the cross-sectional approach
and the Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach. The model is tested by applying the
GMM/SDF approach. Traditionally, time-series regression tests are used, but in my
model, because the financial obligations ratio is not a return factor, I cannot test
the model using time-series regression implications. In other words, the price of risk
6Equivalently, if the quadratic form of the sum of squares of alphas (αˆ′V −1αˆ) is big enough.
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for the financial obligations factor is not equal to the mean of the factor, that is,
λˆF 6= ET (F ). I begin with the cross-sectional approach and then conduct the
Fama-MacBeth regressions. Afterward, I estimate the model using GMM approach.
5.4.1 Cross-Sectional Approach
The main economic idea is to explain why average returns vary across portfolios.
The FCAPM model in (5.10) implies that expected returns of an asset should be high
if that asset has high betas; that is, average returns should be proportional to betas.
The cross-Sectional approach is a two-step procedure. In the first step, I estimate
betas (βM , βF ) by conducting a time-series regression. The time-series regression
formula is:
Reit = ai + βiMR
M
t + βiFFt + 
i
t t = 1, 2...T ∀i. (5.11)
Here, ai are constants, R
M
t and Ft are the right-hand-side variables, and the betas
are the regression coefficients. In the second step, I estimate the factor risk premia
(λM , λF ) by conducting a cross-sectional regression across portfolios of average excess
returns on the estimated betas. Note that in cross-sectional regressions, betas are
the right-hand-side variables, lambdas are the regression coefficients, and alphas are
the cross-sectional regression residuals, the pricing errors. I run the cross-sectional
regression in (5.10) without a constant (i.e, γ = 0 ) because theory posits that the
constant (zero-beta excess return) should be zero.7 Next, I need to complete three
tasks: estimating coefficients, deriving their standard errors, and building a test for
the model. Depending on the assumptions imposed, I use the techniques discussed
below.
7I could also estimate a constant and see whether it is small. This is the trade-off between
efficiency and robustness.
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OLS Cross-Sectional Regression
The OLS cross-sectional regression formula is:
E(Rei) = βiMλM + βiFλF + αi. (5.12)
The assumptions I impose are as follows: (1) betas are fixed and do not change over
time, (2) regression errors and factors are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) over time, (3) residuals are homoskedastic, and (4) factors in cross-sectional
regressions are orthogonal to errors from time-series regressions. Using standard OLS
formulas along with these assumptions, the following is how the estimates, standard
errors, and test of the model are derived.
Estimates: Beta hats, βˆ, are estimated from standard time-series OLS
regressions. λˆ are the slope coefficients in cross-sectional regression, and αˆ are the
errors of cross-sectional regressions:
λˆ = (β′β)−1β′ET (Re) (5.13)
αˆ = ET (R
e)− λˆβ. (5.14)
Standard errors: Standard errors of betas, σ(βˆ), are derived from standard
time-series OLS regressions. Accounting for correlated errors, the standard errors of
factor risk premia λ are calculated as follows:
σ2(λˆ) =
1
T
[
(β′β)−1β′Σβ(β′β)−1 + Σf
]
. (5.15)
In equation (5.15) Σ is the time-series residual covariance matrix Σ = cov(t
′
t) and
Σf is the covariance matrix of factors. Finally, the covariance matrix of alphas (cross-
sectional regression errors) is derived by
cov(αˆ) =
1
T
[
I − β(β′β)−1β′]Σ [I − β(β′β)−1β′]′ . (5.16)
87
Test: I test whether all the pricing errors (α) are jointly zero, using the following
test statistic:
αˆ′cov(αˆ)−1αˆ ∼ χ2N−K . (5.17)
To conduct the test I first compute the number on the left-hand side of (5.17) and
then compare it to the distribution on the right-hand side, which indicates how likely
it is to see a number this large if the true alphas are all zero. In other words, if the
number on the left-hand is big, there is only a small chance of seeing a number this
big if the true alpha is zero. Simply put, by finding big chi-squares, I can reject the
model, meaning that the alphas are not jointly equal to zero.
GLS Cross-Sectional Regression
In the regression model in (5.12) the αi are correlated with each other. For example,
if GM has a low alpha, Ford is also likely to have a low alpha. I run a GLS cross-
sectional regression to address this issue.
Estimates: The estimate of βˆ is unchanged. However, λˆ and αˆ are estimated
from standard cross-sectional GLS formulas:
λˆ = (β′Σ−1β)−1β′Σ−1ET (Re) (5.18)
αˆ = ET (R
e)− λˆβ. (5.19)
Standard errors: Again, the standard errors of betas, σ(βˆ), is unchanged. The
more efficient σ2(λˆ) and cov(αˆ) are derived as below:
σ2(λˆ) =
1
T
[
(β′Σ−1β)−1 + Σf
]
. (5.20)
cov(αˆ) =
1
T
[
Σ− β(β′Σ−1β)−1β′] (5.21)
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Note that the GLS regression should improve efficiency whereas the OLS regressions
are more robust. Hence, I apply both methods and discuss the outcomes in the
“Result” section.
Test: The test statistics looks like the statistic in (5.17) but with a smaller
covariance matrix, reflecting the greater power of the GLS test:
αˆ′glscov(αˆgls)
−1αˆgls ∼ χ2N−K . (5.22)
I also develop an equivalent test that does not require a generalized inverse:
T αˆ′glsΣ
−1αˆgls ∼ χ2N−K . (5.23)
Shanken correction
So far, I have assumed that betas are constant over time. This turns out to be a matter
of concern, even asymptotically. Therefore, I need to use the correct asymptotic
standard errors and covariance matrices of the pricing errors. In all of the following
formulas there is a multiplicative correction (1 + λ′Σ−1f λ). This correction is due to
Shanken (1992).8
σ2( ˆλOLS) =
1
T
[
(β′β)−1β′Σβ(β′β)−1(1 + λ′Σ−1f λ) + Σf
]
(5.24)
σ2( ˆλGLS) =
1
T
[
(β′Σ−1β)−1(1 + λ′Σ−1f λ) + Σf
]
(5.25)
cov( ˆαOLS) =
1
T
(I − β(β′β)−1β′)Σ(I − β(β′β)−1β′)(1 + λ′Σ−1f λ) (5.26)
cov( ˆαGLS) =
1
T
[
Σ− β(β′Σ−1β)−1β′] (1 + λ′Σ−1f λ). (5.27)
The estimates of βˆ are unchanged. For estimates αˆ and λˆ, I can use either the OLS
or GLS approach. I compare the outcomes from different approaches (i.e, OLS cross-
8I need to make a simplifying assumption that the errors t are i.i.d. over time and independent
of the factors.
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sectional regressions using Shanken correction vs. GLS cross-sectional regressions
using the Shanken correction) in the “Results” section.
With regard to testing the model, for the OLS cross-section I can use equation
(5.17) by employing the corrected covariance of errors in (5.27). For the GLS cross-
section, I can use the corrected version of equation (5.23), that is,
T (1 + λ′Σ−1f λ)αˆ
′
glsΣ
−1αˆgls ∼ χ2N−K . (5.28)
As I show in the “Results” section, this correction (1+λ′Σ−1f λ) is too big to ignore,
especially in annual data. Therefore, I need a general method that takes into account
all of these issues, namely, correlated cross-sectional errors, generated regressors, and
time-varying betas. In next section I will use GMM to tackle these issues.
Generalized Method of Moments
I need to take into account the fact that betas are “generated regressors.” So far, I
have been able to relax two assumptions: correlated αis are corrected by using the
GLS method and time-varying βs are taken care of by the Shanken correction. Now,
I take the last step and consider the fact that the betas themselves are estimated. By
using GMM, there is no need to assume that factors are independent of error terms
and that the factors are uncorrelated over time. Below are the moments that I use in
the GMM approach:
gT (b) =

E(Ret − a− βft)
E(Ret − a− βft)ft
E(Re − βλ)
 =

0
0
0
 . (5.29)
where the top two moment conditions come from time-series regressions and the third
condition is the cross-sectional regression of average returns on betas. In equation
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(5.29), a is a time-series intercept, ft = (R
eM
t , Ft) is the vector of factors, and beta
is the vector of market beta and financial obligations beta, that is, β = (βM , βF ). In
GMM, I treat the moments that generate the regressors β (top two moments) at the
same time as the moments that generate the cross-sectional regression coefficient λ
(third-moment conditions). The covariance matrix between the two sets of moments
captures the effects of generating the regressors on the standard error of the cross-
sectional regression coefficients. Now, all I have to do is map the problem into the
GMM notation.9
5.4.2 Fama-MacBeth Approach
In this section, I use the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure to run the
cross-sectional regression and calculate test statistics and standard errors that
correct for cross-sectional correlation. The Fama-MacBeth method is a two-step
procedure. The first step is to find beta estimates by running a time-series
regression. Fama and MacBeth use a rolling five-years regression, but I use
full-sample betas. The time-series regressions are the same as in (5.11):
Reit = ai + βiMR
M
t + βiFFt + 
i
t t = 1, 2...T ∀i. (5.30)
9 The parameter vector is: b′ = [a′β′α]. The aT matrix chooses which moment conditions are set
to zero in estimation:
aT =
[
I2N 0
0 γ′
]
.
γ is the weighting matrix for the cross-sectional regression. The d matrix is the sensitivity of the
moment conditions to the parameters,
d =
∂gT
∂b′
=
[ −IN −INE(f) 0
−INE(f) −INE(f2) 0
0 −λIN −β
]
.
Finally, the S matrix is the long-run covariance matrix of the moments. For more details see
Cochrane (2009, chap. 12).
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The second step is to run a cross-sectional regression at each time period instead of
estimating a single cross-sectional regression with the sample averages:
Reit = βiMλMt + βiFλFt + αit i = 1, 2, ...N ∀t. (5.31)
Again, as theory suggests, I do not add a constant to the cross-sectional equations.
Next, I estimate αi and λ, calculate their standard deviations, and build a test of
the model. Fama and MacBeth suggest estimating λ and αi as the average of the
cross-sectional regression estimates:
λˆ =
1
T
T∑
t=1
λˆt, αˆi =
1
T
T∑
t=1
αˆit. (5.32)
I use the standard deviations of the cross-sectional regression estimates to generate
the sampling errors for these estimates (assuming the standard errors are uncorrelated
over time):
σ2(λˆ) =
1
T 2
T∑
t=1
(λˆt − λˆ)2, cov(αˆ) = 1
T 2
T∑
t=1
(αˆt − αˆ)(αˆt − αˆ)′. (5.33)
As for the test statistic, I test whether all the pricing errors are jointly zero using the
following test,
αˆ′cov(αˆ)−1αˆ ∼ χ2N−K . (5.34)
One advantage of the Fama-MacBeth procedure is that it allows for changing betas,
which is hard to incorporate in a single, unconditional, cross-sectional regressions
or a time-series regression test. As stated earlier, Fama-MacBeth is another way of
calculating the standard errors, corrected for cross-sectional correlations. However,
Fama-MacBeth standard errors do not correct for serial correlation in the errors.
Also note that Fama-MacBeth standard errors do not correct for the fact that βˆs are
generated regressors.
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5.4.3 GMM in Discount Factor Form
In asset pricing, most data such as stock returns and portfolio returns are
characterized by heavy-tailed and skewed distributions. Because GMM does not
impose any restriction on the distribution of the data, it is a good alternative to the
least squares estimation method. For the GMM estimation, I use the approximated
SDF presented in equation (5.5). Here is the equation again:
mt+1 ≈ δ0 + δ1RMt+1 + δ2Ft (5.35)
The moment condition associated with the SDF approximation is:
Et[(δ0 + δ1R
M
t+1 + δ2Ft)R
i
t+1] = 1. (5.36)
Rt = (R
1
t , R
2
t , ..., R
N
t ) denote the vector of returns on N-portfolios at time t. Also, let
δ = (δ0, δ1, δ2) be the vector of unknown parameters and Zt = (R
M
t , Ft) be the vector
of factors. Equation (5.36) implies that the pricing error must be a null vector if the
SDF is correctly specified. Denoting the pricing error with gt(δ) results in:
gt(δ) = Rtmt(δ)− 1N . (5.37)
I can compare the different model specifications by looking at a quadratic form of
the estimated pricing errors implied by the model. Equation (5.38) is one common
quadratic form used as a single number to compare different models in the field:
Q = Et[gt(δ)]
′WEt[gt(δ)], (5.38)
where W is a positive definite matrix called the weighting matrix. The choice of W
plays an important role in the validity of the results. For example, Hansen
(1982)[26] suggests using an optimal weighting matrix (i.e, if errors are i.i.d., then
W = var[g(δ)]−1, which can be simply derived from first-stage GMM under the
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identity-weighting matrix or a simple OLS). The disadvantage of this W is that it is
highly model dependent and a smaller Q could be obtained by simply adding more
noise. To avoid this dependency, Hansen and Jagannathan (1994)[27] suggest the
weighing matrix, WHJ = Et(RtR
′
t)
−1. The decision criterion is called the
Hansen-Jagannathan (H-J) distance and is estimated as below,
DistT (δ) =
[
min
δ
gT (δ)
′ W−1T gT (δ)
] 1
2
. (5.39)
where
WT = W(HJ)T =
1
T
T∑
t=1
RtR
′
t
gT (δ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
[mt(δ)Rt − 1N ].
Hansen and Jagganathan (1997)[28] later show that the H-J distance is equal to the
pricing error for the portfolio most mispriced by the model. Clearly, WHJ does not
depend on model specifications and DistT does not reward SDF volatility; hence, it is
suitable for model comparison. DistT is a measure of model misspecification, meaning
that it gives the distance between mt(δ) and the nearest point in space of all SDFs
that price assets correctly, and it gives the maximum pricing error of any portfolio
formed from the N assets. The H-J distance provides a method for comparing models
by assessing which is least misspecified.
To compare the FCAPM model with different specifications, the null hypothesis
is that financial obligations is relevant for pricing the assets. Under the correct
hypothesis, the H-J distance computed with the proposed model must be smaller
than the H-J distance of the multifactor model that excludes financial obligations.
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5.4.4 Alternative Tests
Actual versus Fitted Expected Returns
As the number of observations increases, almost all of the multifactor models proposed
so far are rejected. Therefore, I need to do some parallel diagnostic tests. The most
common test is to plot the actual returns observed in the data versus the returns
predicted by the model. The more the scattered plot is close to the 450 line, the better
the model fits the data. In the “Results” section, Figure 5.1 compares realized returns
versus the predicted returns of Fama-French’s (1993) 25 portfolios using annual data
between 1980 and 2015. Each point represents one portfolio.
Firm-Specific Characteristics
The question is how to test whether chosen multifactor model is a good approximation
for real data. To examine this, I could add a vector of firm-specific characteristics such
as size, market capitalization, price-to-earnings ratio, book-to-market ratio, and so
on. If the proposed multifactor model is the correct one, firm specific characteristics
should play no role in explaining the returns as they represent risks that can be
diversified away.
Testing for Priced Factors
Can the factor of interest be dropped? I am looking for a statistical procedure to
test which factors survive in the presence of others. There are two right ways to
answer this question. One is by designing a test in a GMM/SDF framework, and the
other is by forming an “orthogonalized factor.” In the GMM/SDF framework, such
a test is very easy. Consider the following general SDF: m = θ1f1 + θ2f2. To test the
given factor f1, is the factor f2 needed to price assets, or equivalently, does θ2 = 0?
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One easy approach to answer this question is the Wald test. Because I do have an
asymptotic covariance matrix for θ = (θ1, θ2),
10 I can form a t-test11 or a χ2 test
with the null θ2 = 0. The Wald test statistic is:
θˆ2
′
var(θˆ2)
−1 θˆ2 ∼ χ2#θ2 ,
where #θ2 is the number of elements in the vector θ2, which in my case is equal to
one. The second solution to my earlier question (of whether the extra factor can
be dropped?) is to form an orthogonolized factor. Consider this two-factor model:
12 E(Rei) = β1λf1 + β2λf2 + αi. Is the second factor f2 needed? Or equivalently,
can E(Rei) = β1λf1 + αi be written? Apparently α will rise, but will it rise “too
much”? To answer these questions I need to run a regression of f2,t on f1,t and take
the residuals,
f2,t = αf2 + b1f1,t + t.
Then I can drop f2 from the two-factor model if and only if αf2 is zero. The intuition
is straight-forward: if f1 is sufficient to price f2 , it is sufficient to price anything
that f2 prices. Hence, αf2 = 0 means that all the αi are the same with or without
including the second factor. This procedure is equivalent to forming the following
orthogonolized factor:
f ∗2,t = αf2 + t = f2,t − b1f1,t.
f ∗2 is a cleaned up version of f2 without any correlation with the first factor. Now if
E(f ∗2,t) = 0, then it is okay to drop the second factor.
10Note that θ is the same as δ estimated in equation (5.36).
11This is true if θ2 is scalar as it is in this chapter.
12I use two-factor model to make it comparable to the FCAPM two-factor model presented in this
chapter. The idea can be extended to any N-factor model.
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5.5 Results
The FCAPM model presented in this chapter is estimated and tested with different
techniques and diagnostic tests discussed throughout this section. Before looking at
the results, look at some characteristics of the data for the sample period between
1980 and 2015. Table 5.3 summarizes the average excess returns of the 25 portfolios
constructed based on size and the book-to-market ratio. The annual excess average
returns range from 6.24% to 19.86%. Table 5.4 summarizes the market betas for these
portfolios, which range from 0.68 to 1.52. As these tables suggest, the average annual
excess returns and betas show large variations across 25 portfolios; hence, there is a
wide dispersion to explain. On average, small size portfolios and high book-to-market
portfolios have higher returns.
Table 5.3: Average Portfolio
Returns
Low Book-to-Market High
Small 6.24 15.45 16.43 18.03 19.86
10.45 14.61 17.31 17.35 16.75
Size 12.18 15.59 15.60 16.55 1.47
14.88 14.23 14.92 15.93 16.42
Big 13.55 13.99 12.85 13.04 14.88
Table 5.4: Market Betas of 25
Portfolios
Low Book-to-Market High
Small 1.52 1.16 0.95 .76 1.05
1.30 0.93 0.81 0.71 0.83
Size 1.21 0.89 0.68 0.83 0.73
1.14 0.83 0.94 0.82 0.94
Big 1.05 0.84 0.91 0.81 0.80
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5.5.1 Cross-Sectional Regressions
The goal is to estimate the parameters of the model in equation (5.12) and
investigate whether the price of market risk (λM) and the financial obligation risk
(λF ) are statistically significant. I report the results using a wide range of
estimation techniques including the OLS/GLS cross-sectional regression,
Fama-MacBeth regression, and GMM. I also correct the OLS/GLS estimates using
the Shanken (1992) correction and report the results. Table 5.5 and Table 5.6
summarize the estimation results under different techniques, using annual data and
quarterly data, respectively.
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Table 5.5: FCAPM Estimation Results (Annual Data)
This table reports results of testing the financial obligations-capital asset pricing model (FCAPM)
using ordinary least squares (OLS) (Shanken (1992)), generalized least squares (GLS (Shanken)),
the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression, and generalized method of moments (GMM). Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors and numbers in brackets are t-statistics. *** indicates significance
at the 1% level.
OLS (Shanken) GLS (Shanken) FMB GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.128*** 0.160*** 0.128*** 0.138***
λM (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.015)
[4.11] [5.49] [4.17] [9.48]
-0.021*** -0.005*** -0.021*** -0.017***
λF (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
[-4.21] [-3.09] [-4.27] [-3.49]
J -test 6.12
P -value 0.014
As Tables 5.5 and 5.6 suggest, different estimation techniques indicate that
financial obligations risk is a relevant component of aggregate risk (at least when
using annual data) and its price is statistically significant at the 1% level. The
J -test is the test of the model using the GMM approach. It indicates that the null
hypothesis that all the alphas are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected at 1%
level using annual data and at the 5% level using quarterly data. Note that the
price of financial obligations risk is negative, which is intuitive. It implies that if a
portfolio has a positive correlation with financial obligations, it should worth more
and hence have a lower expected return.
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Table 5.6: FCAPM Estimation Results (Quarterly data)
This table reports results of testing the financial obligations-capital asset pricing model (FCAPM)
using ordinary least squares (OLS) (Shanken (1992)), generalized least squares (GLS (Shanken)),
the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression, and generalized method of moments (GMM). Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors and numbers in brackets are t-statistics. *** indicates significance
at the 1% level.
OLS (Shanken) GLS (Shanken) FMB GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.032*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.035***
λM (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.002)
[3.77] [4.34] [4.32] [19.86]
-0.013* -0.002 -0.013*** -0.007
λF (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006)
[-1.72] [-0.7] [-3.37] [-0.99]
J -test 4.45
P -value 0.034
5.5.2 Generalized Method of Moments and Stochastic Discount Factor
I estimate the SDF in equation (5.35) and compare the FCAPM pricing
implications with the following models: consumption capital asset pricing model
(CCAPM), CAPM, FCAPM, Fama-French (1993) three-factor model (FF3), and
Fama-French three-factor model plus financial obligations ratio (FFF). The H-J
distance provides a method for comparing models by assessing which is least
misspecified. As can be seen in Table 5.7, FCAPM does a good job using both
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annual data and quarterly data. The H-J distance associated with FCAPM is
smaller than the distance associated with CCAPM, CAPM, and FF3. Comparing
FF3 and FFF shows that H-J distance computed with FFF is smaller than the H-J
distance of the multifactor model that excludes financial obligations. This suggests
that financial obligations risk is important for pricing assets and is a relevant factor.
Table 5.7: Hansen-Jagannathan Distance
Model Quarterly Annual
CCAPM 0.0851 0.1889
CAPM 0.0746 0.1756
FCAPM 0.0665 0.1686
FF3 0.0616 0.1736
FFF 0.0563 0.1674
Using equation (5.35), mt+1 ≈ δ0 + δ1RMt+1 + δ2Ft, I normalize δ0 to be equal to 1.
This normalization has no effect on the pricing implications. Next, I estimate δ1 and
δ2, using iterative GMM. Table 5.8 summarizes the coefficients of market returns and
financial obligations. As this table suggests, the estimates are statistically significant
and the null hypothesis that the moment conditions are correctly specified cannot be
rejected. There are 25 moment conditions and 2 unknown parameters so the degree
of freedom of the chi-square test statistic is equal to 23.
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Table 5.8: GMM and SDF
This table presents results using generalized method of moments (GMM) and stochastic
discount factor (SDF). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors and numbers in brackets
are t-statistics. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
mt+1 = δ0 + δ1R
M
t+1 + δ2Ft
48.90***
δ1 (4.53)
[10.80]
-13.95***
δ2 (4.57)
[-3.04]
J -test 25.328
p-value 0.334
5.5.3 Actual versus Fitted Expected Returns
Figure 5.1 compares realized returns versus predicted returns of Fama-French’s
(1993) 25 portfolios using annual data between 1980 and 2015. Each point represents
one portfolio sorted by size and book-to-market ratio. The inability of the CCAPM
to explain variation in the cross-section of average returns is clear. The adjusted R2
associated with the CCAPM is only 21.75%. The FCAPM model does much better
than the CCAPM. The plot of actual returns versus fitted returns is given in Figure
5.2. The fit is better, with an adjusted R2 of 64.22%.
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Figure 5.1: CCAPM: Actual versus Fitted Returns
Figure 5.2: FCAPM: Actual vs. Fitted Returns
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Firm-Specific Characteristics
One diagnostic test used to see whether the model captures all economy-wide risk
is to extend the model and examine whether adding firm-specific characteristics to
the model can improve its performance. Therefore, I add the average firm size within
each of the 25 portfolios to the FCAPM and estimate the Size-FCAPM model defined
as:
E(Rei) = βiMλM + βiFλF + sizei λsize + αi, (5.40)
where the sizei is the average firm size for each portfolio and λsize is the price
associated with this firm-specific size risk. As can be seen in Table 5.9, firm-specific
size plays no role in explaining the portfolio returns: the coefficient is almost zero
and the t-statistic is not significant. This is not surprising as the risk associated with
firm-specific size could be diversified away.
Table 5.9: Size-FCAPM Model Estimation
This table presents results for the Size-FCAPM (financial obligations-capital asset pricing
model). *** indicates significance at the 1
λM λF λsize
0.125*** -0.021*** 4.23E-07
(0.011) (0.004) (1.05E-06)
[11.68] [-5.17] [0.40]
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Testing for Priced Factors
To test whether given market returns RMt and financial obligations ratios Ft at each
time t, financial obligations ratio is needed to price assets? Or can Ft be dropped?
Using the GMM/SDF approach, this is equivalent to whether δ2 = 0:
mt+1 = δ1R
M
t+1 + δ2Ft.
I use the Wald test to answer this question. Using the standard errors of δˆ2 by
applying the GMM approach, the Wald test statistic and the p-value of the null
hypothesis H0 : δˆ2 = 0 are:
Waldδˆ2 = 9.31, Pvalue = 0.002.
Therefore, as the Wald test statistic suggests, the null hypothesis can be rejected,
meaning that the financial obligations ratio is priced as a factor and the risk associated
with Ft plays an important role in pricing the assets. Another way to check whether
the financial obligations ratio can be dropped is the test I proposed in Section 5.4.3.
Basically, I run a regression of Ft on R
M
t and take the residuals:
Ft = αF + bMR
M
t + t. (5.41)
Table 5.10 summarizes the estimations of (5.41). As can be seen, the intercept αF
is large and statistically significant. Therefore, Ft cannot be dropped. In other
words, market returns alone are not sufficient to price everything that the financial
obligations ratio prices.
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Table 5.10: Can we drop the Financial Obligations Ratio?
This table presents results of estimating equation (5.41). *** indicates significance at the
1% level.
αF bM
0.167*** -0.011
(0.002) (0.007)
[99.71] [-1.34]
5.6 Conclusion
Conditioning down on the financial obligations ratio, the FCAPM proposed in
this chapter survives a wide range of classical econometric and diagnostic tests used
to explain the variations in average returns across 25 portfolios formed based on size
and the book-to-market ratio. I show that the risk associated with aggregate
households’ financial obligations is an economy-wide risk and is priced across
different portfolios of assets. The consistent pricing of financial obligation risk with
a negative risk premium suggests that the household’s financial obligations acts as a
state variable. The intuition is straight-forward. The negative risk premium for the
financial obligations ratio implies that a portfolio that pays off in bad times — that
is, when the financial obligations ratio is high — is more valuable to investors and
there is a hedging demand for it. Hence, this portfolio should have lower expected
returns.
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APPENDIX A
FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS RATIO: DATA
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From Federal Reserves Board 1
The household Debt Service Ratio (DSR) is the ratio of total required household
debt payments to total disposable income. The DSR is divided into two parts:
Mortgage DSR and Consumer DSR. The Mortgage DSR is total quarterly required
mortgage payments divided by total quarterly disposable personal income. The
Consumer DSR is total quarterly scheduled consumer debt payments divided by
total quarterly disposable personal income. The Mortgage DSR and the Consumer
DSR sum to the DSR. Quarterly values for the Debt Service Ratio are available
from 1980 forward.
The limitations of current sources of data make the calculation of the ratio
especially difficult. The ideal data set for such a calculation would have the required
payments on every loan held by every household in the United States. Such a data
set is not available, and thus the calculated series is only an approximation of the
debt service ratio faced by households. Nonetheless, this approximation is useful to
the extent that, by using the same method and data series over time, it generates a
time series that captures the important changes in the household debt service
burden. The series are revised as better data or improved methods of estimation
become available. To create the measure, payments are calculated separately for
revolving debt and for each type of closed-end debt, and the sum of these payments
is divided by disposable personal income as reported in the National Income and
Product Accounts. For revolving debt, the assumed required minimum payment is
2-1/2 percent of the balance per month. This estimate is based on the January 1999
Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey, in which most banks indicated that required
monthly minimum payments on credit cards ranged between 2 percent and 3
1Data description is provided by the Federal Reserve Board. https://www.federalreserve.
gov/releases/housedebt/about.htm
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percent, a ratio that apparently had not changed substantially over the previous
decade.
Payments on closed-end loans, which are calculated for each major category of
closed-end loan, are derived from the loan amount outstanding, the average interest
rate, and the average remaining maturity on the stock of outstanding debt.
Estimates of the amount of mortgage debt are taken from the Federal Reserve
Board’s Z.1 Financial Accounts of the United States statistical release, and
estimates of outstanding consumer debt are taken from the Federal Reserve’s G.19
Consumer Credit statistical release. For consumer debt, a more detailed breakdown
by type of closed-end loan is obtained using internal Federal Reserve estimates and
data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Interest rates
on closed-end consumer loans are obtained from the Federal Reserve Board’s G.19
Consumer Credit and G.20 Finance Companies statistical releases, the SCF, and
additional proprietary data sources. An estimate of the interest rate on the stock of
outstanding debt is obtained by weighting the recent history of interest rates using
information on the age of outstanding loans in the SCF. The interest rate on the
stock of outstanding mortgage debt is an estimate provided by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. Maturity series for consumer debt are taken from the SCF.
Maturity series for mortgage debt are calculated using data from Lender Processing
Services and Mortgage Bankers Association.
The financial obligations ratio is a broader measure than the DSR. It includes rent
payments on tenant-occupied property, auto lease payments, homeowners’ insurance,
and property tax payments. These statistics are obtained from the National Income
and Product Accounts.
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APPENDIX B
LINEARIZING THE PRICING KERNEL
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In this appendix, I explore how the model proposed in Chapter 3 is able to generate
a more volatile kernel while keeping the risk-free interest rate low. The linearized
version of the stochastic discount factor is:
Mt+1 = β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ (
St+1
St
)−γ
= β exp
{
(−γ)
(
ln
Ct+1
Ct
)}
exp
{
(−γ)
(
ln
St+1
St
)}
,
where Ct is aggregate consumption and St is the surplus consumption ratio defined
as St =
Ct−Gt
Ct
. Gt is aggregate financial obligations in period t. Taking the logarithm
from both sides and letting ct = ln(Ct) and st = ln(St) result in the following:
lnMt+1 = ln β + (−γ)(ct+1 − ct) + (−γ)(st+1 − st). (B.1)
Now, some simplifying assumptions need to be made. For aggregate U.S. data on per
capita consumption of nondurables and services, a good approximation to the data
is the following model that makes the growth in the log of per capita consumption a
random walk with drift:
ct = µc + ct−1 + σct, where t i.i.d. ∼ N(0, 1). (B.2)
Assuming that the growth in the surplus consumption ratio also follows a random
walk,
st = µd + st−1 + σdt, where t i.i.d. ∼ N(0, 1). (B.3)
Note that µd and σd are the drift term and standard deviation term of the random
walk process for the surplus consumption ratio. Now using (B.2) and (B.3) in (B.1)
result in the following:
lnMt+1 = ln β + (−γ)(µc + σct) + (−γ)(µd + σdt). (B.4)
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Because t is i.i.d. ∼ N(0, 1), then lnMt+1 is also normally distributed with mean µ
and variance σ2:
µ = ln β + (−γ)µc + (−γ)µd (B.5)
σ2 = (−γ)2σ2c + (−γ)2σ2d (B.6)
From a property of normal distribution,1 E(Mt+1) and σ(Mt+1) can be derived as
follows:
E(M) = exp(µ+
σ2
2
) (B.7)
σ(M) = E(M)
√
exp(σ2)− 1. (B.8)
Having E(M) and σ(M) in hand, I can now derive an equation for gross risk-free rate
RF and explain the intuition behind:
Rf = E(M)
−1 ⇒ ln(Rf ) = ln(1 + rf ) = − lnE(M) = − ln(exp(µ+ σ
2
2
)) = −µ− σ2/2
Using equations (B.7) and (B.8), the approximate risk-free rate is:
rf ≈ − ln β + γµc + γµd − γ2 σ
2
c
2
− γ2 σ
2
d
2
(B.9)
Equation (B.9) has some important implications. There are five terms in this equation
that according to the set-up of my model can be interpreted as follows:
1Property: If logX ∼ N(µx, σ2x), then E(X) = exp(µx + σ
2
x
2 ) and std(X) = E(m)
√
exp(σ2)− 1.
Here std denotes a standard deviation.
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1. − ln β: As β, the time discount factor decreases, agents become less patient and
require higher interest rates to substitute consumption over time. For example,
if β is calibrated to 0.99, this means that approximately 1% of the risk-free rate
is due to time preferences.
2. γ µc: For γ > 0, this implies that as consumption growth increases,
individuals should be compensated with higher interest rates to sacrifice
today’s consumption for tomorrow’s consumption.
3. γ µd: For γ > 0, this implies that in recessions, when consumption gets close
to financial obligations, the surplus consumption ratio decreases and investors
require higher interest rates.
4. −γ2 σ2c
2
: Analogous to standard consumption-based models, this part of
equation (B.9) can be interpreted as precautionary savings. The coefficient of
consumption growth volatility is negative, implying that as consumption
growth becomes more volatile, precautionary savings push the interest rate
down.
5. −γ2 σ2d
2
: This term adds up to the precautionary savings part of equation (B.9)
due to economic uncertainties. As the volatility of the surplus consumption
ratio increases, demand for safer assets increases which leads to lower interest
rates. This is what enables my model — unlike the standard consumption-based
model — to generate lower risk-free rates for higher coefficients of risk aversion.
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